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ARTICLE
IS COMPETITION POLICY THE LAST THING
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE NEED?
James Langenfeld and Marsha W. Blitzer*
INTRODUCTION
State-owned monopolies currently pervade the economies of every
country in Central and Eastern Europe. In many sectors these state-
owned and sanctioned monopolies can prevent the development of a
healthy free-market economy and inhibit reform. Merely transforming
state monopolies into private ones, however, could only do very little to
benefit consumers and workers in these countries. Among other efforts,
Central and Eastern European countries must introduce competition to
replace centralized pricing systems that have led to prices that do not
reflect the costs of production and have reduced the incentives for man-
agers to provide products that citizens in these countries want. To be
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reau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission. Dr. Langenfeld and Ms. Blitzer
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Trade Commission and Department of Justice assistance efforts. Opinions expressed
within this paper, as well as errors and omissions, are the responsibility of the authors
alone and do not necessarily reflect opinions of the Federal Trade Commission or any
employees, members, agents, or representatives thereof. The authors wish to thank
Karin Richards for her excellent research assistance, and the Journal's editors, particu-
larly Janet Whitehill, and staff, who have greatly improved the quality of the article.
The authors are also grateful for the comments of a number of colleagues at the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. In particular, special thanks are due to Chairman Janet Stei-
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Anna Fornalczyck of the Polish Antimonopoly Office, Ambassador Ognian Pishev of
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able to correct these inefficiencies, newly-created government agencies
charged with competition policy enforcement are likely to be critical in
ensuring competition. With the myriad of problems associated with
transforming an economy from centrally planned to market based,
however, one could legitimately question how competition policy fits
into the broad array of significant economic transformations. Should it
be the highest priority, the lowest, or somewhere in between? More-
over, what type of competition policy and analysis might be useful and
how would it relate to the other reforms?
Accordingly, several Central and Eastern European governments im-
plementing economic reforms requested assistance from the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) in order to ensure a smooth transition into a
market economy. The FTC and the DOJ are the two agencies of the
United States government that are responsible for enforcing antitrust
laws. As such, they are in a unique position to advise foreign govern-
mental agencies charged with the same tasks. Moreover, the FTC and
the DOJ are experts in the economic analysis of industrial
organizations.
In 1990, the Support for East European Democracy Act (SEED
Act)' and the Agency for International Development (AID) granted
the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ funding to implement
technical assistance projects in the area of competition policy and law
enforcement in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In 1991, a mission to Bul-
garia took place. In addition, several countries requested that the staff
of the two United States agencies provide informal analyses of draft
antimonopoly legislation.
In September 1990, the two agencies sent to Poland a team com-
posed of a lawyer and an economist from the FTC, a lawyer and an
1. Support for East European Democracy Act, Pub. L. No. 101-179, 103 Stat.
1299 (1989) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5401). The purpose of the Act is as follows:
to promote political democracy and economic pluralism in Poland and Hungary
by assisting those nations during a critical period of transition and abetting the
development in those nations of private business sectors, labor market reforms,
and democratic institutions; to establish, through these steps, the framework for
a composite program of Support for East European Democracy (SEED).
Id. The SEED Act authorized money for a variety of different programs for three fiscal
years. Id. Specifically, the FTC and DOJ received their funding from the Technical
Business Assistance Working Group (TEBAG), an inter-agency group chaired by the
Commerce Department, the objective of which is to aid the transition of the East Euro-
pean countries to private market economies by channeling technical business assistance
to them in non-financial sectors.
On November 5, 1990, President Bush signed the Foreign Operations Appropriations
for 1991. Appropriation No. 101-968. The appropriation includes assistance for East-
ern Europe in order to implement the SEED Act. Id.
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economist from the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, and an administra-
tive officer from the FTC. The lawyers and the economists were respon-
sible for explaining how investigations are carried out, the legal and
economic analyses applied, and the eventual resolution of cases. The
FTC dealt with the industries which it normally handles in the context
of civil proceedings, such as the petroleum, food processing and distri-
bution, and chemical processing industries. The Antitrust Division of
the DOJ addressed industries that the DOJ ordinarily investigates both
in the civil (mergers) and criminal (price fixing) contexts, such as the
steel and construction industries. The administrative officer addressed
antitrust enforcement from a management perspective. He advised an-
timonopoly officials on administrative management, and shared his ex-
perience in the supervision of finance and administrative service activi-
ties. He also reviewed the Poles' plans with an eye toward insuring that
the Antimonopoly Office acquires and effectively utilizes the labor, fi-
nancial resources, physical facilities, and management tools necessary
to accomplish its mission. In addition, the Polish antimonopoly officials
requested that the team analyze the antitrust dimensions of restructur-
ing specific industries such as oil, food distribution, and
telecommunications.
In October 1990, a team of two economists and one lawyer travelled
to Czechoslovakia 2 to consult with the Czechoslovak officials responsi-
ble for drafting antimonopoly legislation for presentation to Parlia-
ment. In addition, the Czechoslovaks requested that the team discuss
how the government might identify those enterprises with an unjustified
monopoly position that require dismantling.
The teams also encountered significant interest in consumer protec-
tion in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, because various forms of
deceptive and unfair business practices have arisen with the deregula-
tion of prices and privatization.3 While the discussions focussed primar-
ily on competition issues, we explained our view of the advantages of
having one government agency enforce both competition and consumer
protection laws. Much of the information presented in this article was
obtained during FTC staff travels in Central and Eastern Europe or
from discussions and correspondence with the officials and experts of
the relevant countries. This article will discuss the progress of economic
reform in several Central and Eastern European countries. Part I of the
2. Czechoslovakia has been renamed "the Czech and Slovak Fcderal Republic."
See Czechoslovakia Picks New Name, Wash. Post, April 21, 1990, at A21.
3. See Eastern German Buyers Learning the Hard Way, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24,
1991, at 10 (stating that consumers in East Germany have discovered some unfair and
deceptive business practices in their new capitalistic economy).
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article will discuss the major elements of economic reform. Part II will
examine the importance of competition policy in creating a market
economy. Part III explains some key differences in analyzing competi-
tion in the United States and countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
Part IV examines the problem of how to achieve consumer choice. Part
V analyzes the progress of economic reform in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. Part VI concludes the arti-
cle, suggesting that the competition policy of the United States will be
useful in the reform process taking place in Central and Eastern
Europe.
I. MAJOR ELEMENTS OF ECONOMIC REFORM
The basic elements of economic reform crucial to a successful transi-
tion to a free-market economy are not greatly disputed.4 These basic
elements include price liberalization, privatization, banking and fiscal
reform, liberalization of foreign trade and investment, and exchange
rate reform. 5 We, as well as many analysts, believe that demonopoliza-
tion and strong antitrust policies are also critical elements in this
process.6
There is disagreement, however, concerning the timing and order in
which these reforms should take place. Many believe that the Central
and Eastern European countries should pursue these reforms simulta-
neously and as quickly as possible.' Poland, for instance, has come clos-
est to implementing this approach. The government utilized "shock
therapy" to attempt to cure hyperinflation and the other effects of ten
years of partial reforms, although key areas such as privatization have
progressed very slowly.
8
4. See THE INST. OF INT'L FIN., INC., BUILDING FREE MARKET ECONOMIES IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND REALITIES (1990) [hereinafter
BUILDING FREE MARKET ECONOMIES] (recognizing that Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries will not realize economic gains without far-reaching reforms).
5. Id. at 29-30.
6. See M. HINDS, ISSUES IN THE INTRODUCTION OF MARKET FORCES IN EASTERN
EUROPEAN SOCIALIST ECONOMIES 100 (1990) (asserting that Eastern European mar-
kets cannot function without private ownership and advocating rapid privatization of
socialized businesses); see also R. RAHN & R. UTT, THE NATIONAL CHAMBER FOUN-
DATION, REPORT OF THE BULGARIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH & TRANSITION PROJECT ch.
2, at 8, ch. 4, at 18 (1990) [hereinafter BULGARIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH & TRANSI-
TION] (advocating the breakup of Bulgarian monopolies for the establishment of a com-
petitive economy in Bulgaria and explaining that substituting private monopolies for
state-owned monopolies will only perpetuate their inefficiencies).
7. BUILDING FREE MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 4, at 30.
8. See generally House, In East Europe, Only Poland Makes Hard Decisions,
Wall St. J., June 5, 1990, at A24; Engelberg, First Sale of State Holdings a Disap-
pointment in Poland, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, at DI; Harden, Poland's Bittersweet
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Other analysts suggest that the logistical difficulties of such a major
transition require implementation at a slower pace, accomplishing each
critical element or set of critical elements in turn.9 Trade liberalization,
for example, may yield unacceptably high unemployment as consumers
buy high quality Western goods instead of the inferior, high cost do-
mestic goods. Moreover, certain reforms require time to implement,
such as the creation of a banking system, and the government may be
able to take transitional steps prior to full reform. Further, countries
may accomplish some aspects of reform, such as training management
and consumers in how to function in a market environment, more effec-
tively if all of the changes do not occur simultaneously. In fact, both
Hungary and Bulgaria slowed their privatization process because of
perceived "sweetheart" deals in sales of tourist and other enterprises.10
This slower approach, however, runs the risk of extending the transition
process, and accordingly, extending existing and imposing new hard-
ships on the populace. Such delays undermine the expectations of the
people and can cause political unrest as politicians promise "quick
fixes" to the country's ills.
Whichever approach countries choose to adopt, each element of eco-
nomic reform is integrally linked to the others. Thus, both trade liber-
alization and competition are necessary to replace government price
controls.' Similarly, a convertible currency promotes both trade liber-
alization and price reform. 2 Furthermore, if the countries cannot ac-
complish all reforms simultaneously, the order in which the reforms
Chocolate Woes, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 1990, at AI; Newman, Poland Unlocking Mys-
teries of Privatization, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1990, at AI I (stating that although many
small retail establishments have rapidly developed and been privatized, and over half of
Poland's trucks, for instance, have been sold to private individuals, only five state-
owned enterprises had been privatized by the beginning of 1991); Harden. East Eu-
rope's Effort to Sell State Firms off to Slow Start, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1991. at CI
(noting that one of the reasons for slow privatization is lack of domestic capital needed
to buy the companies); Poland Pioneer of Capitalism, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1991, at
A22 (discussing the novel approaches the Polish legislature is considering to speed up
privatization).
9. See, e.g., The Value Subcontractors of Eastern Europe, ECONO?,iST, Jan. 5,
1991, at 51 (suggesting that the Eastern European countries should privatize immedi-
ately but slowly implement trade reforms).
10. See Greenhouse, Paths to Capitalism: Remaking Eastern Europe, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 31, 1990, at I (stating that the Hungarian government has avoided taking some of
the harsher measures required for privatization); BULGARIAN EcONO.tic GROWTH &
TRANSITION, supra note 6, ch. 2 at 2 (discussing the sequence of various plans relating
to Bulgaria's transition to a market economy). In the Bulgarian tourist industry, the
concern was primarily that the old Communist nomenklatura would become the big-
gest capitalists, rather than a concern about foreign ownership.
11. BULGARIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH & TRANSITION, supra note 6. ch. 4 at 30.
12. Id. at 34.
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take place can prove critical. As suggested in recent press accounts,
Czechoslovakia's freeing of prices on January 1, 1991, without ade-
quate trade and competition reform, may have contributed to substan-
tial price increases, at least some of which do not appear to be based on
costs or competitive market forces. 13 The Czechoslovak example high-
lights not only the significance of the timing of reforms, but also the
importance of demonopolization, as well as strong antitrust policies in
the transition toward a market economy.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN
CREATING A MARKET ECONOMY
A. WHAT IS THE GOAL OF COMPETITION POLICY?
In the United States and other nations with developed antitrust poli-
cies, there is debate concerning the goal of competition policy. Al-
though there are various subtleties in the positions of many scholars
and policy-makers on this subject, two major categories are important
for purposes of the inquiry: (1) consumer welfare and economic effi-
ciency, or (2) protection of individual competitors, often from control
by larger, dominant firms. 4 Governments largely base the consumer
welfare standard on the existence or creation of "market power" by
enterprises, which enables them to raise prices above costs. The exer-
cise of such power usually reduces economic efficiency by reducing out-
put and growth, effectively limiting the size of the economy and redis-
tributing wealth from consumers to producers and managers.
Protecting competitors from the abuses of dominant firms can achieve
the same goals as promoting consumer welfare and efficiency, but only
when the dominant firm has monopoly power and is exercising that
power to reduce output and raise prices. 15
13. Prices up Sharply in Czechoslovakia, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1991, at A5 (re-
porting that Czechoslovak officials blame the doubling of retail prices on the failure to
dismantle Czechoslovak retail monopolies before freeing prices).
14. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 7 (1978) (discussing the disagree-
ments among scholars regarding the fundamentals of antitrust law and advocating a
total social welfare analysis to judge antitrust conflicts); see also Lande, Wealth Trans-
fers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 151 (1982) (arguing that Congress enacted antitrust
laws to improve consumer welfare by implementing broad and flexible economic con-
trols rather than to increase corporate efficiency at the cost of the natural corporate
redistributive tendencies).
15. See generally BONER & KRUEGER, THE BASICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY: A RE-




Market power is a function of market share and economic market
structure. Market structure analysis examines the number of compet-
ing suppliers, the ease of entry into a market, the existence of trade
barriers, and the presence of markets for substitute goods.10 Domi-
nance, on the other hand, is a function of the supplier's absolute size,
its customer and direct supplier links, and its ability to gauge its trad-
ing partners' economic strength.17 Laws of competition derived from
market power and efficiency theories develop from consumer welfare
concerns. Conversely, laws rooted in dominance theories often serve to
protect competitors rather than competition, although their enforce-
ment can benefit consumers.18
The European Community (EC) and the German Cartel Office, for
example, have implemented competition laws designed more to prevent
the abuse of a dominant firm than to encourage structures and private
incentives to encourage competition. 19 In contrast, competition laws,
current case law, and policy of the United States focus more on market
power and efficiency as the keys to consumer welfare.20 Both ap-
proaches have merit, particularly with respect to economies in the pro-
cess of transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy.
The emerging market economies of Eastern and Central Europe may
find the EC approach, outlined in articles eighty-five and eighty-six of
the Treaty of Rome,2 of particular interest. These newly-created mar-
kets may find some of the post-war experiences of Germany and the
other European economies especially relevant. These newly-created
markets also want to become part of the united European Community
scheduled for 1992. Similar competition laws would help ease this
transformation. Nevertheless, we believe that the United States model
is very well suited for Eastern and Central Europe. It offers a more
explicit weighing of anticompetitive effects and efficiencies that will en-
courage growth and benefit consumers in the long run. Moreover, a
similarity of Eastern and Central European competition rules to United
States competition rules will encourage American business to become




19. Id. at 31; Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the
European Community: Efficiency. Opportunity and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
981, 982 (1986) (explaining different antitrust law theories).
20. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 27.
21. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-11)
(official English translation).
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lytic reasons, discussed below, and because the presence of similar rules
facilitates American firms' ability to learn about the system.
The evolution of competition policy is extremely instructive in dem-
onstrating the advantages of the approach of the United States. Ger-
many, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the EC founded their
competition laws on the concept of market dominance. To a large and
increasing extent, however, market power and economic efficiency have
become important in other market economies with competition
laws-even in Germany and the EC.22 As discussed below, there may
be reasons why new entrants into the market should receive some spe-
cial privileges as a centrally planned economy moves to a market econ-
omy. Over time, however, many governments that had believed anti-
trust laws should attack dominance to protect competitors have
reconsidered and have, at a minimum, deemphasized this as the proper
goal of antitrust law.
The major challenge in approaching competition policy from a con-
sumer welfare viewpoint is the potential trade-off between competition
and growth. In Japan and South Korea, for example, consumer welfare
oriented competition policies were less important than growth and ex-
clusively pro-business policies. 3 In Japan, the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) attempted to coordinate business activities
and defeat the normal workings of competitive markets. 4 The success
of these countries may in part be due to such activities, although many
question this conclusion.26 Even if this conclusion is correct, such poli-
cies, at best, have helped investment by creating monopolies and coor-
dinating oligopolies without sharing many of the benefits with the pop-
ulation.26 Central European countries, driven by a desire for democracy
and freedom and a wish that the general population share in the bene-
fits of a market economy, have initiated reforms. Consumer welfare
22. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 18 (stating that the EC and Germany
originally enacted their laws in order to prevent dominant power abuses, and have both
instituted market share criteria in their definitions of joint dominance). Additionally,
several countries, such as Australia and Canada, have amended their laws to follow the
United States model more closely. Id. at 23.
23. See id. at 23 (observing that South Korea designed its antitrust laws after those
of Germany and Japan, thereby relying predominantly on economic development policy
and the furtherance of economic liberalization).
24. Id. at 32.
25. See generally, Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, HARV. Bus.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990 (refuting conventional theories of competitive success and sug-
gesting that countries gain a competitive advantage through innovation).
26. See BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 32 (stating that in the 1970s the
Japanese public was unsatisfied with the exercise of market power, particularly regard-
ing resale price maintenance and administered pricing in oligopolies).
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and efficiency, as embodied in a market power approach to competition
policy, are extremely important to Central Europe because only compe-
tition policy based on this premise ensures that the general population
of these emerging democracies will share fully in the benefits of a mar-
ket economy, without significantly deterring growth.
If the main purpose of antitrust laws is to maximize consumer wel-
fare and economic efficiency, to succinctly define the process that will
achieve the goal of market-based competition is useful. Several draft
antimonopoly laws of Eastern and Central Europe have attempted to
do this. The United States antitrust laws, however, do not attempt to
define competition, partially because Congress enacted them when an
existing market economy used the court system to define the specifics
of the law and competition." In short, people understood competition
because they experienced it in most industries. In the formerly cen-
trally planned economies of Europe, no such tradition exists, and often
the court systems have been poor arbiters of conflicts and commercial
disputes. Accordingly, defining competition is the logical starting place
of a new law, both in terms of clearly stating the goal of the competi-
tion policy and providing guidance to the courts. One definition that
might be appropriate for Eastern European governments to use is:
Competition is economic rivalry in a market in which each seller and buyer inde-
pendently makes decisions, so that consumers have sufficient choice among sellers
(or potential sellers) to force the actions of sellers (1) to effectively limit each
other's ability to raise prices above costs for significant periods of time, (2) to
drive costs to their lowest level, and (3) to encourage creation and production of
goods that buyers demand.
This definition highlights the elements of competition that maximize
welfare and efficiency-buyer choice, and independent behavior of sell-
ers-and provides the major outcomes of such a competitive market.
B. COMPETITION POLICY AS PART OF THE MARKET CREATION
PROCESS
Authorities suggest that the existence of competition is the funda-
mental difference between a centrally planned economy and a true
market-based economy.28 Centralized price controls and monopoliza-
tion of production and distribution by state owned enterprises charac-
27. See R. BORK, supra note 14, at 58-61 (addressing the ambiguous meaning of
"competition" and providing definitions of the term).
28. See BUILDING FREE MARKET EcONONIES, supra note 4, at 2 (recommending
that all economic reforms need to be placed in the context of a broader strategy aihned
at modifying attitudes toward a market economy and developing a supporting legal and
institutional framework).
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terize the economies of Central and Eastern Europe. As privatization,
price decontrol, and laws encouraging the creation of new business are
implemented, the governments must take steps to ensure that public
monopolies do not become private monopolies. To control monopoly
abuse, competition laws in some countries, such as the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and Poland, have anti-"price gouging" statutes ena-
bling antimonopoly officials to roll back price increases that they have
determined to be supracompetitive.29 However, such price regulation
can return the economy to a centralized pricing system with all of its
associated problems. In a market economy, competition from other do-
mestic or foreign firms can limit price increases to those justified by
costs and serve as a substitute for price controls.
To illustrate how such competition and demonopolization are neces-
sary parts of market reforms, consider how they complement price lib-
eralization. Price liberalization is the ability of enterprises to set their
own prices rather than having a central planning office calculate prices,
and is essential for any decentralized market economy. When managers
are free to contract they can better gauge the demand for their prod-
ucts by testing the price consumers are willing to pay and by buying
the goods needed to produce those products. In a framework of enforce-
able property rights, managers will respond to the long run interests of
the enterprise's shareholders by supplying products where the price
they can charge equals or exceeds the costs of production °.3  In 1776,
Adam Smith was the first to describe this "invisible hand" process of
decentralized decision-making, 1  the central feature of market
economies.
29. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 882-83 (stating that the German Fed-
eral Cartel Office has imposed administered prices in order to remedy dominant enter-
prises' abuses).
30. See generally, M. HINDS, supra note 6, at 100 (proposing that market forces
cannot efficiently allocate resources absent private ownership as a means of produc-
tion). Property rights are important because if they are inadequately defined, managers
and workers will not make correct long run investment decisions. For example, in Po-
land and Yugoslavia, the government gave managers the ability to set prices and make
investment decisions in state-run enterprises. The government, however, did not judge
managers' ability to efficiently produce goods consumers demanded and to provide
profits to shareholders that invested in the enterprises. Id. Instead, managers only had
the incentive to keep workers and themselves satisfied because the government focused
on the lack of labor unrest when evaluating their performance. Id. This situation led to
the granting of relatively high wages for all in the enterprise in the short run, but there
was virtually no new investment. Id. The competitiveness of Yugoslav companies suf-
fered greatly yielding the same result of government-owned enterprises in the rest of
Central Europe: poor quality expensive products which will lead to lower wages for the
workers in the long run as the enterprises try to make up for higher costs through real
wage cuts. Id. at 17-21.
31. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
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Along with price liberalization and privatization, competition is criti-
cal to establishing a market economy. Citizens will not receive the full
benefits of a market economy if economic reform leaves enterprises and
citizens with no consumer choice. Only when buyers can choose be-
tween competing goods will competition-or potential competition from
new entrants-limit price increases and eliminate the need for price
controls. Absent consumer choice, prices will tend to be set at monop-
oly levels and output will be reduced, whether enterprises are state or
privately owned .3 This is even more likely when the entry of new com-
petitors is time consuming and difficult. Entry is difficult, for instance,
when countries do not have a developed credit and banking system or
when monopoly suppliers of essential products and services are in a
position to block entry. For this reason, creation of consumer choice
from independent suppliers should be one of the first goals of all mar-
ket reforms.33
Establishing competition is a critical step in the transition from a
centrally planned to a market economy. 3' For example, Central and
Eastern European countries need to reform prices, many of which are
set below costs of production, in order to encourage the production of
desirable goods and discourage the production of unwanted goods.33
When to establish competition and how to establish competition, how-
ever, may prove difficult to determine. For instance, the Soviet Union
recently demanded that its Eastern European trading partners, for-
merly connected through Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON),36 have payment arrangements for Soviet oil based on
32. See Prices up Sharply in Czechoslovakia, supra note 13 (stating that Czecho-
slovakia and Bulgaria have recently experienced this occurrence).
33. If there is only one or very few buyers, then a similar problem may arise called
"monopsony."
34. See BUILDING FREE MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that the
most important reform is to encourage competition).
35. See The Value Subcontractors of Eastern Europe, supra note 9 (noting that
free-market prices force the economy to use resources efficiently).
36. See M. HINDS, supra note 6, at 7, n.10 (listing COMECON members as Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam, and the U.S.S.R.); see also Brus, Postwar Reconstruction
and Socio-Economic Transformation, in II THE EcoNoMic HISTORY OF EASTERN Eu-
ROPE 1919-1975, at 571 (M.C. Kaser ed. 1986) (describing the origins of the
COMECON). The Soviet Union created this economic organization in response to the
Marshall Plan; see generally, KASER, COMECON: INTEGRATION PROBLEMS OF THE
PLANNED ECONOMIES (2d ed. 1967) (providing an in-depth description of the
COMECON). COMECON will be abolished soon. The Warsaw Pact Vanishes, Wash.
Post, Feb. 28, 1991, at A15; COMECON Calls It Quits, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1991, at
A10.
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the use of world prices.3 7 These demands, combined with the cut in
Iraqi oil supplies due to the war in the Persian Gulf, further weakened
vulnerable and inefficient economies.38 Ideally, the decentralized price
setting would allow oil prices to rise to reflect the Soviets' costs and to
encourage individuals and enterprises to conserve energy. In reality,
however, absent competition in the sale and distribution of oil and
other goods within Poland, prices may have been raised beyond the
level dictated by cost increases to also reflect monopoly profits.39 The
structure of the household sector (e.g. central heating systems for large
sections of cities) often does not allow for a rapid change in consumer
behavior, and a quick response to price changes is tempered by sup-
plier/client links that cannot be changed overnight. Although the an-
ticompetitive effect may not prove true with regard to oil in Poland,
there is evidence to suggest that such results occurred with respect to
other goods in Czechoslovakia and Poland.4
The difficulty of establishing competition quickly cannot be underes-
timated. As suggested by Kroll, introducing competition prior to the
decontrol of prices is unquestionably an economically desirable strat-
egy; whether it is practicable, however, remains to be seen.4 Implicit in
the proposed strategy is the premise that breaking up state enterprises
can introduce competition into a socialist economy without difficulty.
C. CAN FREE TRADE TAKE THE PLACE OF COMPETITION POLICY?
Some argue that economies of countries such as Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Bulgaria, and others, are sufficiently small that the act of open-
ing the borders to trade without tariffs or quotas and the creation of
convertible currency will be sufficient to instill competition in these
37. See Czechs Lay down the Line on Energy Policy, Financial Times (London),
Feb. 15, 1991, at 4 (reporting that Czechoslovakia seeks to reduce its dependence on
Soviet oil); Gas Line or No Line, Either Way, It's a Problem in E. Europe, Wash.
Post, Jan. 3, 1991, at A18 (reporting that Poland's gas prices will likely rise from two
dollars a gallon to three or four dollars a gallon).
38. See Knight, Cautious Capitalism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 5, 1990,
at 54 (noting that energy costs nearly tripled after the Soviet Union raised oil prices
and that the Gulf crisis cost eight billion dollars in hard currency).
39. Prices up Sharply in Czechoslovakia, supra note 13; Bulgaria Announces
Sharp Price Increase, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1991, at A3.
40. See Prices up Sharply in Czechoslovakia, supra note 13 (reporting that state
monopolies took advantage of the freeing of prices to raise prices 80 to 100%). Miros-
lay Zamocnik, spokesman for the Finance Ministry, stated that the high prices have no
relation to the state enterprises' costs. Id.
41. KROLL, REFORM AND MONOPOLY IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY 36 (1990) (ex-
plaining the difficulty of the breaking up of state enterprises).
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countries. Free trade is especially vital to Eastern Europe.4 2 It is the
single most effective way-perhaps the only way-to instill real compe-
tition in the industries of Eastern Europe, which are otherwise too con-
centrated, too politically powerful, or too small to generate domesti-
cally based competition. Free trade will allow Eastern Europe to
"import" a rational price structure.
3
Most Western economists agree that import competition may be the
sole means to ensure competition in certain concentrated industries."
Several factors suggest, however, that an active antitrust policy com-
bined with privatization is also necessary and may even need to precede
full trade liberalization. First, trade liberalization alone may cause too
strong of a shock to an economy whose enterprises cannot compete in a
free market. For example, Poland suffers from a significant reduction
in output and increased unemployment due in part to the trade liberali-
zation of January 1, 1990, currency convertibility, and the reduction of
tariffs and other trade barriers which have enabled Polish consumers to
substitute Western for Polish goods. 5
Second, not all markets are international, so there is the potential for
monopoly pricing nationally and locally.46 To illustrate, Central Euro-
pean countries currently undergoing reform range in population from
forty million (Poland) to nine million (Bulgaria). While economies of
these sizes are not likely to be as self-contained as countries the size of
the United States, their size is comparable to many regional United
States markets. Local United States markets, often smaller than this,
can experience anti-competitive effects in industries such as health
care, real estate, food distribution, and certain industrial processes.' 7
Third, the variation in exchange rates and trade barriers exist in even
the most open economies, and can inhibit effective competition from
imports.
42. See Sachs on Poland, EcONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1991, at 61 (declaring that free
trade is "vital to Eastern Europe").
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Value Subcontractors of Eastern Europe, supra note 9, at 51 (reporting
that Poland's enterprises laid off workers and ran below capacity because the govern-
ment introduced free trade prematurely). But see Sachs on Poland, supra note 42, at
43 (describing Poland's increase in net trade from 58.5 billion to SI 1.4 billion in 1990).
Some industries expanded export while Poles bought fewer foreign goods due to the low
value of the zloty. Id.
46. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 20.
47. See Preferred Physicians. Inc., 110 F.T.C. 157 (1988) (discussing anticompeti-
tive effects in the health care industry); Multiple Listing Service Mid County. Inc.. 110
F.T.C. 482 (1988) (alleging anticompetitive effects in the real estate industry); and
Allegheny Corp., 110 F.T.C. 93 (1988) (regarding the reduction of competition in the
production and sale of title information).
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Finally, anticompetitive agreements can exist between domestic and
foreign firms. Under certain circumstances, a single large firm's unilat-
eral actions can damage competition. As Part III of this article notes,
several factors suggest that these conditions and practices are more
likely to occur in countries that are emerging from a system of state-
owned monopolies than in countries that have long free-market
traditions.
Wary of the four factors discussed above, many economists believe
that active competition policy and trade liberalization must go hand in
hand to ensure competition. For example, Boner and Krueger conclude:
Antitrust policy is best suited for protecting competition among domestic suppli-
ers and can be effective in protecting competition among foreign suppliers .... In
this sense, antitrust policy is a (perhaps limited) substitute for trade policies that
permit ... foreign competition .... Nevertheless, it is more appropriate to view
antitrust policy and trade liberalization as complementary means of pursuing ec-
onomic efficiency since the effect of trade liberalization on competition is solely
structural. Thus, trade liberalization cannot encourage competitive behavior and
performance in economic markets that are concentrated at the international
level, nor can it ensure competitive conduct as antitrust policy does.
4 8
We agree that the Central and Eastern European countries need to
develop adequate antitrust laws and law enforcement capabilities in or-
der to stimulate competition and fully benefit from the economic re-
forms. The governments of Central and Eastern Europe recognize the
need to create strong laws and institutions to nurture competition, but
they are just embarking on the process. Poland, Hungary, and Czecho-
slovakia now have antimonopoly agencies, although only Poland's and
perhaps Hungary's agencies have been established long enough to be
fully functioning.
III. SOME KEY DIFFERENCES IN ANALYZING
COMPETITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE
A. ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES
For the past forty years, Central and Eastern European leaders
forced their economies to centralize production and distribution, and
made competition illegal. This centralization created large, inefficient
firms that were incapable of competing outside the sheltered trading of
COMECON, unless the state heavily subsidized the production. In
Czechoslovakia, for example, the average enterprise has three thousand
48. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 115 (emphasis in original).
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employees, while in the West the average is closer to three hundred.49
Further, prices in Central and Eastern Europe seldom reflect the costs
of production.50 Rationing, rather than price, has been the main
method of allocating scarce goods and services. This system has re-
sulted in a progressive decline in the standard of living over the past
ten years, the result of forty-five years of central planning.
During the last ten years, attempts at reform in Poland, Hungary,
and Bulgaria produced little economic improvement. Bulgaria, for ex-
ample, attempted to encourage the creation of new independent enter-
prises beginning in 1982. A recent study, however, revealed that few
new independent firms appeared in the main areas of the economy,
while many new large state enterprises developed."' Recent radical
changes worsened conditions in Eastern Europe rather than improved
them. Countries raised the prices of staple goods in order to cover their
costs and stimulate supply. Price increases in Poland,52 Czechoslova-
kia,5 13 Hungary," and Bulgaria, 55 when accompanied by wage restraints
as in Poland, resulted in a significant reduction in real income. 0 With-
out the wage restraints, however, hyperinflation threatens to strangle
these economies, as almost occurred in Poland.
49. Authors' interviews with Czechoslovak officials, Prague, Czechoslovak, Septem-
ber 16-30, 1990.
50. See Soviets Bar Hike in Bread Price, NEWSDAY, June 15, 1990, at 7 (reporting
that government plans to raise the price of bread ignited severe protest). For example,
bread costs the equivalent of only a few pennies in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria,
although its costs of production are significantly higher. Id. Consequently, farmers in
the Soviet Union feed their livestock bread instead of the grains that go into its manu-
facture. See id. (noting that the nonsensical relation between cost and price encourages
waste).
51. Presentation by D. Jones and M. Meurs, On Entry in Socialist Economies:
Evidence from Bulgaria, Allied Social Sciences Association Meetings, Atlanta, Geor-
gia, 1989, at 19 (commenting that "[a]t the productive heart of the economy, few
small, independent firms have emerged and the number of extremely large state firms
have actually increased").
52. Poland Gets New Prime Minister. Walesa Appointee Promises to End 'Totali-
tarian Legacy," Chicago Tribune, Jan. 5, 1991, at 4.
53. See Prices up Sharply in Czechoslovakia, supra note 13 (reporting that retail
prices increased by an estimated 80-100% between Sept. 30, 1990 and Jan. 30, 1991).
54. See Hungary: Price Rises to Come into Force in Near Future, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 10, 1991, at EE/W0I61/A/I (reporting that price in-
creases in January 1991 will raise the price of milk and dairy products by 35%).
55. See Bulgaria Announces Sharp Price Increases, supra note 39 (reporting that
the price of electricity, heating coal, and gas would increase by 400-600%).
56. See Poland Gets New Prime Minister, Walesa Appointee Promises to End
"Totalitarian Legacy," supra note 52 (reporting that reforms caused almost a one-
third drop in real incomes). But see Sachs, supra note 42 (suggesting that Western
economists overstate the size of real income). Even if overstated, little doubt exists that
these transitions created significant economic hardships.
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Implementing competition policy can prevent both private and state
enterprises from engaging in monopoly practices that aggravate the
woes resulting from price increases and structural transformations. An-
titrust officials in these countries, therefore, confront different economic
conditions than do their counterparts in established market economies.
Nevertheless, emerging antitrust agencies should ask the same basic
questions in investigating and deterring anticompetitive acts as estab-
lished agencies. For example, a competition agency may use the exis-
tence and unlawful exercise of market power to identify areas of activ-
ity in either an established or a burgeoning market economy. The new
agencies will find, however, that the answers to some of the basic ques-
tions about the existence of market power will differ substantially be-
tween the United States and the economies undergoing transformation.
Several aspects of the Eastern and Central European economies cre-
ate cause for concern regarding the existence and abuse of market
power. Most of their industries consist of state-owned monopolies or
state-sponsored cooperatives. Import impediments may persist even if
import controls and hard currency shortages end. Barriers to entry ex-
ist in Eastern and Central European markets. Finally, managers
trained in centrally planned economies tend to collude rather than
compete.
In most Central and Eastern European industries either state-owned
monopolies or a small number of state-sponsored cooperatives exist.
These companies tend to be inefficiently large and actively protected
from competition. Denied a reliable market system to provide their ba-
sic needs, these enterprises vertically integrated in order to provide in-
puts that companies in a market economy would purchase." Creating
competition and making these enterprises efficient, particularly for
large enterprises in heavy industry such as automobile manufacturing
and petroleum refining and distribution, pose serious problems. These
enterprises have controlled key inputs and distribution centers, making
domestic competition for these manufacturers impossible.58 New com-
petitors are then forced to overcome these established relationships or
create their own systems. To become efficient, these firms must also
57. For example, many Polish enterprise managers in industries such as dairy, meat
and fish processing, construction, and textile manufacturing manage enterprises that
own machine shops, retail and distribution centers, and vacation and health facilities
for workers. Many of these enterprises were local monopolies supporting underutilized
subsidiaries that were not part of their core business. (Account based on author's rc-
cent trip to Poland.)
58. See Harden, supra note 8 (noting that until recently the largest Polish choco-
late manufacturer nearly monopolized the import of cocoa).
[VOL. 6:347
COMPETITION POLICY
shed underutilized subsidiaries such as machine shops. Such activity
will improve efficiency as a competitive market for these inputs devel-
ops. If the monopolists or a number of small competitors acting to-
gether retain key inputs or distribution centers, however, then they may
charge monopoly prices absent effective competition from imports. Mo-
nopoly potential through vertical integration rarely occurs in estab-
lished market economies. Where vertical integration is efficient, compe-
tition forces companies to develop their own supplies. Where such
integration is not efficient, companies rely on independent suppliers.
Antitrust officials seek to prevent the creation of market power through
non-competitive means but permit a concentration of market power if
the economics of production and the competitive process result in a
small number of firms.
Second, the removal of import impediments such as import controls
and hard currency shortages will not ensure competition in many in-
dustries. As suggested in Part II above, the lack of established trading
companies can still impede competition from imports in Central and
Eastern European countries. Moreover, the lack of capital and con-
sumer savings place many inputs and consumer products out of the
reach of companies and individuals. Unlike countries such as the
United States, where imports can check domestic firms' potentially an-
ticompetitive behavior, imports into these countries barely police such
conduct. Trade is potentially more important to these countries than it
is to the United States, however, because their small economies, with
the exception of the Soviet Union, enable only one or two producers to
operate efficiently within many industries.
Third, significant barriers to entry exist in Eastern and Central Eu-
ropean markets. In well-developed capital markets, with managers and
workers trained in business, risk taking, and the market system, im-
bued with entrepreneurial spirit, entry can quickly eliminate or fore-
stall anticompetitive behavior or actions. The emerging market econo-
mies lack these capitalist qualities. The need for capital is a barrier to
entry in these countries. Entrepreneurial skills and the lack of key in-
puts are also barriers. For example, the inefficient construction indus-
tries in these countries may take five to ten years to build an apartment
building. The United States Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines
classify an industry with barriers to entry as one where it takes more
than two years for effective entry.59 Under this definition, many indus-
tries that would not be subject to market power due to potential entry
59. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines- 1984, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,103, § 3.3, at 20,562 (June 14, 1984).
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in the United States could be subject to the abuse of market power in
Eastern and Central Europe.
Fourth, Eastern bloc managers have been trained to collude, rather
than compete. Thus, even if the changes in Eastern and Central Europe
create independent enterprises, these managers will tend to organize in
order to coordinate pricing and divide markets. Managers in the United
States, trained to compete in the free market and exposed to antitrust
law, are less likely to collude or otherwise restrict competition.
These four aspects of the economies in Eastern and Central Europe
illustrate the important role that market power and efficiency questions
play in competition analysis. In addition, the recent history of the cen-
trally planned economies portends that answers to these questions will
vary greatly from those reached in analyses of market economies.
Many of the variations, in fact, suggest that greater potential for an-
ticompetitive activities exist in these countries, at least during a transi-
tional period, than in the United States.
B. INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES
Not only must Central and Eastern Europeans modify and privatize
state owned enterprises in order to create a market economy, they must
also streamline the remaining parts of their governments to facilitate
the transition. This process can be painfully slow. For example, in one
year of reforms, the Polish government successfully privatized many
small businesses6" but only five large "joint stock" companies.61 Czech-
oslovakia, meanwhile, enjoys success in its systematic sale of small as-
sets, such as restaurants and retail establishments, 2 but has yet to
privatize large enterprises. In light of the difficulty of transforming in-
stitutions and eliminating "red tape," the ability of these governments
to sell assets so quickly is impressive. To develop competition policy,
these governments will have to consider four points: (1) the need for
quick action; (2) the limitations on competition agencies; (3) the limi-
tations on governmental infrastructures; (4) and the manner in which
regulators traditionally addressed industrial organization matters. Each
60. Telephone interview with Swierkocki, Polish Antimonopoly Office (Feb. 13,
1991) (reporting that Poland had privatized over half of all trucks).
61. See Newman, supra note 8 (noting that the government selected these five
companies to act as models of privatization); Engelberg, supra note 8 (reporting that
four of the five companies failed to sell all their stock).
62. See Czechoslovakia Aims to Open Stock Exchange this Year, May Issue
Vouchers to All Citizens, 8 Int'l Trad Rep. (BNA) 206 (Feb. 6, 1991) (reporting that
the government had sold thousands of hotels, restaurants, and other small businesses).
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of these aspects of competition policy poses particularly difficult
problems in the transition to a market economy.
First, the demand for prompt privatization exemplifies the need for
quick decision-making by a competition agency. After suffering a sig-
nificant decline in living standards, the citizens of Central and Eastern
Europe have little patience for further hardships. These hardships are
inevitable, however, as states close inefficient enterprises, create more
efficient ones, and dismantle the institutions of state planning. If com-
petition policy slows this process, then its costs may outweigh its
benefits.
Each evolving economy approaches this problem differently. In Po-
land, the Ministry of Ownership Transformation (the Ministry) must
obtain approval from the Antimonopoly Office before selling joint stock
companies.63 Such an approval process, unless performed efficiently,
could slow the transformation process. The Antimonopoly Office often
analyzes the sale in order to certify that the transformation will not
create competitive problems.6" Realizing the potential for delay, the
Antimonopoly Office, with the assistance of the Ministry, attempts to
obtain records at the same time as the Ministry in order to gain a head
start in its analysis.65
Similarly, other countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria,
have drafted laws requiring the competition agency to approve con-
tracts before they take effect. 6 Competition agencies in developed mar-
ket economies typically do not review contracts in advance because of
the administrative burden of tracking and reviewing countless transac-
tions. Because prior approval requirements tax even efficient estab-
lished agencies of countries not experiencing the dramatic changes of
Central and Eastern Europe, the evolving agencies should consider ap-
proaches other than prior approval. For example, agencies could re-
quire business people to provide notice of contracts likely to be prob-
lematic. While notification may create some uncertainty for business
people, the agencies could reduce this uncertainty by reducing the pun-
ishment for those who register. In turn, the competition agency's diffi-
culty of obtaining information will diminish.
63. Polish Monopolistic Practices Act, ch. 2, art. 4, § 1(3) (Feb. 24, 1990).
64. Id. at ch. 5, art. 10, § 1(5).
65. Id. at ch. 5, art. 20, § 3(2).
66. Arbess, Czechoslovakia Opens for Business, Financial Times (London), Mar.
7, 1991, at 23.
67. There is little information on most industries in these countries, in large mea-
sure due to accounting data that bears no relation to the economic value of assets. The
Antimonopoly Office relies heavily on universities and research institutions to develop
meaningful statistics on issues such as market shares.
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Second, to develop competition policy governments must provide
their competition agencies with effective organization. The organization
of these agencies depends on many factors. In the United States, the
FTC and the DOJ each have their own strengths and weaknesses. The
DOJ prosecutes alleged violators of antitrust statutes before the federal
courts. The FTC prosecutes and adjudicates cases before they reach
the general court system. The FTC uses "administrative law
judges"-high level civil servants-and five Commissioners, of which
no more than three may be from one political party, to decide claims
based on antitrust statutes through administrative proceedings. 68 Upon
receiving the final administrative decision, parties to the claims seek
review of the decision in the federal courts of appeal.
The ultimate organization of an antimonopoly office partially de-
pends on the existence and scope of other institutions, such as the judi-
ciary. Most of the Central and Eastern European countries lack the
strong, independent judiciary that the United States has. Therefore, the
establishment of administrative bodies such as Poland's Antimonopoly
Office and Court, fashioned after the FTC, may be effective.
Third, the agencies' ability to analyze competition quickly will shape
antimonopoly laws. If a country lacks a strong legal system or has little
expertise in administering complicated regulations or conducting case-
by-case analyses, then that country should consider adopting a simple
antimonopoly structure and regulatory framework. At present, the
evolving market countries do not have experience with competition is-
sues and with the difficult process of obtaining accurate data and
records. Accordingly, evolving countries with transitional economies
should adopt per se rules rather than the complex rule of reason analy-
sis until the reviewing system develops expertise.
Finally, to effectively implement competition policy these govern-
ments might consider changing the manner in which they address in-
dustrial organization matters. Most economists and government offi-
cials trained in centrally planned economies think in terms of setting
price and output rather than delegating these decisions to managers of
competing enterprises. Accordingly, in implementing new antimonopoly
laws and price control laws regulators may focus on "price gouging"
cases. In such cases, regulators face the nearly impossible task of deter-
mining the correct price of a good or service from a government office.
68. The FTC also prosecutes and adjudicates claims based on several statutory pro-
visions that are not addressed to antitrust, but to other aspects of business activities
affecting consumers. These include that portion of the FTC Act aimed at "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 57(a).
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Such cases potentially recreate the inefficient government initiated pric-
ing system. They also divert limited resources away from the structural
changes that create competition by creating consumer choice. In con-
trast, antitrust policy in the United States avoids setting prices despite
better access to company records because of the belief that markets,
rather than governments, best set prices.
IV. MAINTAINING VERSUS CREATING COMPETITION:
HOW TO ACHIEVE CONSUMER CHOICE
In the evolving market economies of Central and Eastern Europe,
antimonopoly laws have two basic goals. First, they must help guide the
economy through the transition from a centrally planned to a market
economy. Second, they must defend the market economy from attempts
to reimpose monopoly practices. This section first addresses the basic
components of a law designed to maintain competition, and then dis-
cusses how such a law might be altered in order to create competition
in a formerly centrally planned economy.
A. MAINTAINING COMPETITION
Antitrust law in the United States is effective at maintaining compe-
tition. It approaches potentially anticompetitive acts using a "per se,"
"rule of reason," or "prima facie" decision rule, depending on the cate-
gory of the restraint.69 Most Eastern and Central European laws and
draft laws embody a similar approach. Yet, they tend to categorize the
restraints and the conditions under which the restraints are likely to be
held illegal in ways that are much closer to those used by the German
Cartel Office and the European Community. Before addressing these
differences, however, this section will consider the relative benefits of
each approach.
Clearly, the competing per se and rule of reason standards can create
tension in competition law and policy.70 Competition agencies and
courts must balance judicial efficiency, business certainty, and judicial
accuracy."1 A per se standard provides clear guidance to businesses and
promises judicial efficiency by limiting delays in determining the legal-
69. J. Langenfeld, Antitrust Enforcement: The Gray Area of Agreements among
Competitors, presented at the CATO Institute Conference: A Century of Antitrust:
The Lessons and the Challenges, 21-22 (Apr. 11, 1990).
70. Id. at 2.
71. See Fisher, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAUF. L. REv. 777 (1989)
(discussing the trade-off between simple and complex legal rules in antitrust).
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ity of an act or ownership transformation.7 2 While the per se rule may
condemn some activities that benefit consumers and promote economic
efficiency, reduced costs of decision-making and the increased business
certainty will offset the loss of these benefits. Further, because per se
bans on certain agreements among competitors encourage challenges of
potentially anticompetitive acts, a plaintiff can devote less time and en-
ergy to bringing a case than under a rule of reason inquiry, discussed
below. Moreover, a plaintiff successfully characterizing a restriction as
per se illegal usually wins.
A rule of reason analysis, in contrast, weighs the probable benefits
against the potential harms of an act. A rule of reason analysis could
be made in most areas of competition analysis, but it is cumbersome
and time-consuming. Moreover, the rule of reason analysis demands
reliable information on the industry in question and on the actions of
its enterprises. This information increases the accuracy of the decision-
making process by devoting resources to weighing the potential an-
ticompetitive costs against the benefits of the action. This process, how-
ever, entails a great deal of time and expense. In addition, it creates
uncertainty in the business community, both foreign and domestic, and
as a result, discourages some procompetitive activities. Nonetheless, be-
cause plaintiffs in the United States carry the burden of proof in rule of
reason cases and then must satisfy certain evidentiary requirements to
prevail, rule of reason analysis tends to favor defendants.7
The prima facie approach has the same drawbacks as the rule of
reason. 7  It also requires sophisticated economic judgments.75 Unlike
the rule of reason approach, however, the prima facie approach shifts
the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. Like the per se
approach, therefore, the prima facie approach favors the plaintiff. One
disadvantage of the prima facie approach is that it may give large,
72. Langenfeld, supra note 69, at 4.
73. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 187 (1977)
(describing the elements of the rule of reason). First, the plaintiff must specify the
practice involved. Id. Second, the plaintiff must show that the purpose of the practice
was anticompetitive. Id. Third, the plaintiff must prove that the restriction imposed
substantially impedes competition. Id.
74. Under this approach, the plaintiff presents limited evidence which, if not rebut-
ted by the defendant, is held sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's case. A typical example
is a charge of price discrimination under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Typically, the plaintiff shows a price difference charged by a seller to competing cus-
tomers. The price difference makes out a prima facie case of price discrimination held
injurious to competition among the competing customers. The charge can be rebutted
by the seller showing that its price difference was cost based, or that its lower price was
to meet a lower price charged to the customer by a competitor of the seller.
75. The judgments are needed both in terms of the types of cases suitable for this
approach, and in terms of developing and interpreting rebuttal evidence.
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sophisticated enterprises a competitive advantage because they possess
a greater ability to collect and present the evidence necessary to prove
the efficiency of a practice or its lack of harmful effect on consumers. 6
United States law has used all three of these approaches. Which one
is used depends on the likelihood that the activity in question will re-
duce competition already existing or will enhance that competition by
encouraging more efficient methods of production or distribution. For
example, United States law targets certain agreements among competi-
tors as per se unlawful because economic theory and practical experi-
ence indicate that these "horizontal" agreements present the clearest
danger of monopolistic pricing. United States law includes horizontal
price fixing, bid rigging, market division, and certain group boycotts in
its per se category because these actions directly limit competition by
effectively enabling competitors to act as if there was one firm setting
price, and offer substantial efficiencies in a relatively limited set of
cases. 7 The DOJ can even file criminal suits against those engaging in
these per se illegal activities. 8
In contrast, the recently enacted competition law of Czechoslovakia
follows an approach closer to that of Germany and the EC. It analyzes
potential cartel arrangements under a rule of reason standard by ex-
plicitly balancing efficiencies against anticompetitive concerns rather
than treating them as per se illegal. United States law also treats many
types of agreements among competitors under a rule of reason or a
prima facie approach,7 9 particularly research and development and
other joint ventures where there is an integration of assets.80 Experi-
ence suggests, however, that maintaining competition requires vigilance
and strong remedies when dealing with horizontal restraints.
United States law now treats vertical arrangements as rule of reason
cases, with the exception of resale price maintenance.81 For other verti-
cal arrangements, such as price discrimination and tying, United States
law uses a set of screening procedures to determine if the actions can
be classified as illegal. German and EC laws, however, tend to be much
76. This potential disadvantage may be offset if the law targets dominant firms for
extra antitrust scrutiny, as do many of the draft and existing Eastern and Central
European laws.
77. There are even exceptions to this generalization. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (discussing price setting).
78. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8.
79. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS (2d ed. 1984);
Massachusetts Board of Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988).
80. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operators-1988, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,109 (Nov. 10, 1988); National Cooperative Research Act of
1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05.
81. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 79, at 119.
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harsher in their regulation of firms' treatment of their suppliers in or-
der to prevent "abuse" of a dominant position.
Vertical agreements between a buyer and a seller may be anticompe-
titive, but their use may also improve competition. Under United States
law, a rule of reason analysis of vertical restraints weighs the potential
anticompetitive harm against the potential pro-competitive benefits.
One example of a pro-competitive vertical restraint occurs where a
manufacturer grants the distributor the exclusive right to distribute the
products. This may be the only way to convince distributors to carry its
products and advertise them. New entrants often use this arrangement
to begin selling their products in market economies. A ban on exclusive
distribution rights between a manufacturer and a distributor can pre-
vent new products from reaching consumers. Therefore, challenges to
this type of buyer-seller agreement occur only if evidence shows that
the agreements reduce total output in a market by either raising prices
or reducing product quality or services. Given the existence of a com-
petitive market, there is a danger that interfering with a company's
right to contract with its suppliers and distributors will reduce, not fos-
ter, competition.
Problems will arise if the law does not distinguish between horizontal
and vertical restraints. For example, the impact of territorial-based
sales agreements can be different depending on whether the agreement
is between a producer and a distributor or between competitors. Hori-
zontal territorial-based sales agreements between producers is a form
of collusion that is highly likely to restrict competition and limit con-
sumer choice. However, to increase its sales, a food processing plant
may, for example, want to have exclusive sales territories for its distrib-
utors, a vertical agreement. Although such an agreement may restrict
competition between distributors for the food processor's output, the
restriction could increase competition between food processing plants as
the food processor finds it easier to get distributors at more locations to
carry its products thereby giving the consumer of the finished product
more choice.
United States law also targets unilateral actions by firms designed to
maintain or create a monopoly under section two of the Sherman Act,
which requires that the monopoly firm be engaged in "the willful ac-
quisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident." '82 To decide when to attack a monopo-
list's practice that might be considered anticompetitive, the United
82. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
[VOL. 6:347
COMPETITION POLICY
States relies on a higher level of market share than those used in the
EC.8" Many of the draft and enacted Central and Eastern European
laws require that there be a "dangerous probability" of the practice
being successful. In countries with economies much smaller than the
United States economy, domestic firms may need to be large to achieve
economies of scale in production. Accordingly, why such low thresholds
would be necessary or desirable once there has been a transition to a
functioning market economy is unclear.
Professor Fox has pointed out that European "[C]ommunity law
evolved from a tradition of hospitality to industrial concentration com-
bined with receptivity to government regulation that would limit the
exercise of power. '  The American approach has been to maintain
consumer choice by preventing excessive concentration resulting from
anticompetitive acts. The highly active United States merger law pro-
vides a good example of this philosophy. 85 As Aaron Director and Ed-
ward Levi suggested:
A perennial fear in the application of the Sherman Act is that it will cut down
units which have grown to great size only because of the economies of large
scale, that is, in response to the demands for efficiency. But during this earlier
period [around 1900], the means of growth used by monopolies in many indus-
tries were mergers or acquisitions. It could be argued, although not without some
doubt, that, presumably, growth because of the economies would not take the
form of merger or acquisition in so many industries. The underlying rationale
behind this presumption is that it would strain credulity to believe that in so
many industries that ideal arrangement for one firm would be merely the collec-
tion into one ownership unit of factories which were originally justified as parts
of separate firms. In the reasoning of the law, the method of growth through
mergers or combination thus could be used as some evidence of intention to mo-
nopolize, and as an answer to the efficiency argument. 8
United States merger policy, as described in the DOJ Merger Guide-
lines, takes a prima facie approach. Given certain concentration levels
and barriers to entry, the DOJ will challenge mergers absent clear rea-
sons why the merger is unlikely to lead to a tendency to reduce
competition.
The EC's United Brands v. Commission8" case highlights the
problems with an approach that relies primarily on regulating behavior
83. See BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 34, 35, 39.
84. Fox, supra note 19, at 982.
85. About one-half of FTC competition expenditures are on merger enforcement.
86. Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv.
281, 282-83 (1956).
87. 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8429 (1978), as discussed in Fox, supra note 19, at 994-1004.
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rather than structure. United Brands was a vertically integrated com-
pany with forty to forty-five percent of the sales of bananas to the
Community. Olesen, the largest ripener-distributor in Denmark,
wanted preferential treatment over United Brands' other distributors,
but United Brands refused. Olesen then became an exclusive dealer to
one of United Brands' competitors. United Brands' sales fell in Den-
mark as Olesen deliberately pushed the competitor's bananas and took
more care in ripening the competitor's bananas, leading United Brands
to terminate Olesen. The Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties held that the termination was an abuse of dominant position be-
cause United Brands' market share was above the EC market share
cut-off. The court reasoned that "a dominant firm.., cannot stop sup-
plying a long-standing customer who abides by regular commercial
practice, if the orders placed by that customer are in no way out of the
ordinary. '"88 As illustrated, such reasoning can confuse protecting com-
petition with protecting a medium-sized competitor. United Brands had
good reason to terminate Olesen and replace it with another distributor
that would provide adequate service. As Professor Fox suggests, "the
sanction may have been excessive, even under United States law.","
The EC apparently continues to pursue such cases. 0 Given the diffi-
culty of determining which acts are anticompetitive, the United States
approach is advantageous. Such an approach targets potentially an-
ticompetitive actions only when firms have much larger market shares,
and accordingly, a higher probability of succeeding than those shares
noted in EC and other European laws. The United States also attempts
to balance efficiency explanations for most vertical arrangements with-
out the presumptions built into EC law.
B. CREATING COMPETITION
Although United States policy to maintain competition may be pref-
erable to the approach taken by Germany and the EC, antitrust laws
similar to those in the United States could be insufficient during the
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. For instance,
many enterprises in centrally planned economies are state-owned and
operated monopolies that have not obtained their position by offering
better products at lower costs. Instead, they have obtained their posi-
tions by governmental fiat. Moreover, the United States bases antitrust
88. Id. at 292; Fox, supra note 19, at 996.
89. Fox, supra note 19, at 1003.
90. Exclusive Sales Scheme for Distribution of Cosmetics Runs Afoul of Article
85, 60 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1505, at 322 (Feb. 28, 1991).
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laws on the assumption of well-defined private property rights and free-
dom of voluntary exchange in a generally competitive environment.9' In
contrast, state enterprises are different from United States private en-
terprises because state enterprises operate under different rules and
their managers are subject to different incentives. 2 These differences in
rules and incentives could require antitrust powers different from those
in the United States.
In particular, antitrust laws in the United States do not govern the
activities of government controlled enterprises and only have limited
control over regulated industries.93 In Central and Eastern Europe, the
existence of well established state monopolies could hinder the develop-
ment of new competitors by denying the new entrants access to critical
distribution facilities or to inputs needed for production. Accordingly, if
state-owned enterprises are not all quickly privatized, then strong an-
timonopoly laws must govern state as well as private enterprises at least
through the transitional period.
In addition, laws such as those of the German Cartel Office and the
EC could provide additional muscle to fight entrenched monopolies that
could use their existing contracts, control over resources, and distribu-
tion systems to prevent competition.9 ' Such additional power is most
appropriately directed at phasing out monopolies, as in the case of the
Czechoslovak competition law, because there is a potential for some
aspects of these laws to be used to prevent, rather than encourage,
competition.
Although there are differences between the United States and Cen-
tral European economies with respect to the specific economics and the
stages of market development, the analytic approaches do not vary, and
the goals of creating consumer choice and promoting economic effi-
ciency would be the same.
Many observers agree that an aggressive "demonopolization" cam-
paign is necessary to create competition. In examining the most prob-
lematic of all these economies to reform, the Soviet Union, the Interna-
91. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, EcONOM1Ic NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS
20-32 (1974) (describing the basis of antitrust law in the United States and citing the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act).
92. See supra note 4 (describing the motivations of state enterprises vis-a-vis the
private enterprises).
93. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 79, at 605-19 (1984) (setting forth the
effect of government involvement in United States antitrust law); see also id., ch. X
(outlining the exemptions from antitrust coverage under United States law).
94. It is difficult to see why relatively low concentration levels used in EC and
German competition policy would be used to classify an enterprise as a dominant firm,
unless the measure of market share includes many firms that would not be included in
an antitrust market.
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tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development conclude:
there is also an urgent need for an effective framework of antimonopoly laws and
regulations, along with the institutions to enforce them. The framework should
abolish . . . restrictions that limit the range of goods that a firm can produce,
assure rights of new entrants, help prevent collusion among enterprises and dis-
courage predatory behavior that would lead to the monopolization of an industry.
The current tendency for enterprises which are now in a particular branch minis-
try, to join together in trade associations is a matter of concern, since it may
favor oligopolistic rather that competitive behavior. One major barrier to the en-
try of new firms is the highly monopolized state supply system. The breakup and
privatization of wholesale trade should thus be among the first priorities of eco-
nomic reform.
Because production in some sectors is concentrated in a single or very few
enterprises, it will be desirable to split up such firms in order to increase
competition. 5
Active use of antimonopoly laws to discourage monopolistic practices is
needed, but a program to create consumer choice rapidly will probably
be most effective at creating a true market economy.
Creation of consumer choice may be achieved through several means
in the state-owned enterprise countries. First, where possible, govern-
ments could divide state monopolies into several independent companies
manufacturing the same or similar products. Ideally, this process would
occur as the state enterprises are privatized as contemplated in Poland
and Czechoslovakia,96 but such division probably should not be delayed
even if privatization is slowed due to non-economic reasons.9 7 The num-
ber of effectively competitive firms created by dividing existing state
monopolies will vary, depending on the specific industry, the economics
of production, and distribution. For example, initially there may be lit-
tle need for single enterprises to control multiple retail establishments
in a relatively small geographic area. Independent retail stores that are
free to set their own prices can offer local customers selection and
would have incentive to vie for customers by cutting prices and reduc-
ing costs, particularly if those stores are privatized. Czechoslovakia's
95. THE ECONOMY OF THE USSR: A STUDY UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO A RE-
QUEST BY THE HOUSTON SUMMIT; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AND EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT 28 (Dec. 1990) [hereinafter THE ECONOMY OF THE USSR].
96. Id.
97. See Dialog (television broadcast, Oct. 9, 1990) (interview with a senior man-




rapid "small privatization" is an explicit recognition of the lack of sig-
nificant competitive problems associated with privatizing these
establishments. 8
Multiple plant manufacturing and distribution firms could also be
broken into independent competitors, particularly if there are not sig-
nificant cost savings from a single company operating the plants. Such
a program could be carried out even if an enterprise can only be di-
vided into two, three, or four independent competitors because each ad-
ditional competitor is likely to enhance marginally the prospects of
competition, and some industries may achieve competition with only a
few competitors. However, to create sufficient choice of input suppliers,
and prevent existing enterprises from denying key resources to new en-
trants, it may be necessary to be aggressive in cutting connections be-
tween input suppliers and manufacturers of final goods. How much ver-
tical integration should be encouraged should depend on the industry in
question, and the extent to which integration can be the source of pro-
ductive efficiencies. In certain circumstances, the efficiency benefits of
vertical integration may have to be balanced against the benefits of
creating new competition through privatization and demonopolization.
For example, if some firms are privatized by separating input supply
facilities from "downstream" functions so that producers and users of
these input products are separate enterprises, this may create another
market which was otherwise missing. This new market may foster com-
petition and entry at both levels, both among producers and users of
the input product. Accordingly, it may be better to err on the side of
creating too many firms rather than too few, and then permit mergers
only if there is good reason for reconsolidation. Once such a division of
state-owned enterprises takes place, active enforcement of the state's
competition law is likely to be necessary to prevent former colleagues
from agreeing to charge the same price or divide markets into local
monopolies.
A second method of creating buyer choice would be to permit the
import of products from other countries. An influx of imports can cre-
ate choice almost instantly. Imports may be the best alternative when
breaking monopoly enterprises into multiple independent suppliers is
not possible and when the minimum efficient-sized firm is one plant or
a single enterprise. In fact, the ultimate goal of market economies is to
minimize tariffs, quotas, and other impediments to internal and inter-
national trade, as suggested by the GATT agreements. Such trade is
particularly important where local monopolies control the supplies of
98. Id.
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products.9 9 If trade liberalization is not possible for all goods, liberali-
zation could be targeted towards those industries where consumers will
not otherwise have choice.
If the lack of convertible currency or limited buyer income prevents
imports from providing effective consumer choice in monopolistic in-
dustries, then a state may pursue two legislative solutions to achieve a
market economy: (1) a competition law to create conditions encourag-
ing new market entries; and (2) a price regulation law to control mo-
nopoly pricing by some existing enterprises. Statutes designed to create
competition and place any limits on pricing may be phased out or elim-
inated once sufficient competition is created in all targeted industries.
To be most effective, the government ministry in charge of privatiza-
tion should be required to act within the confines of the creation of
competition law. The law might require consultation between that min-
istry and the agencies enforcing the full scope of the country's competi-
tion laws, and perhaps have the right to veto the sale of an enterprise
as the Polish antimonopoly law and the Czechoslovak privatization law
apparently permit.
Conditions to encourage new entry might also include the require-
ment that the monopolist help subsidize new entrants in all levels of
production and distribution, including producing inputs, producing the
product itself, and establishing distribution. 100 The government should,
however, limit any price controls to the monopolist and not the new
firms and phase them out as new entrants provide sufficient competi-
tion. 10 1 This would be similar to the experience of the United States in
demonopolizing long distance telecommunications. As discussed above,
price controls of any sort could re-evolve into the centralized pricing
system that has performed so poorly in these countries during the last
forty years.
99. See K. DAM, GATT: LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 17-22
(1970) (describing GATT's philosophy of inhibiting tariff and non-tariff barriers to
free trade).
100. The United States has forced the limitation as well as the subsidization of
production and distribution of certain products in monopoly enterprises. See Tucher,
A TT Rivals Ask for Help; Complain of High Costs. Regulation May Do Them in,
Wash. Post, May 5, 1985, at F1 (describing how "competition may be dead before it
takes its first breath" with respect to ATT's monopolistic dominance of the United
States telecommunications industry).
101. See Troutman, FCC Says It Will Review A TT's Market Dominance, REUTER
Bus. REP., Apr. 12, 1989, at I (describing FCC restrictions placed on ATT, but not on




After a general discussion about competition policy and the transfor-
mation of centrally planned to market economies, it is useful to con-
sider specifics of some of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
Although there are many similarities, each country faces somewhat dif-
ferent problems and is approaching the changes in at least slightly dif-
ferent ways.
A. POLAND
In many ways, Polish antimonopoly policy is the most developed of
all the Central and Eastern European countries. Poland has had an
established antimonopoly law and operating office since early 1990.
This office has initiated many investigations and, at the time of this
writing, has had at least one of its cases on appeal in the Polish Su-
preme Court. This lead is not surprising, however, given Poland's ten
year period of reform that has lead to the radical changes over the last
two years.
On July 22, 1952, a new constitution made Poland a "people's de-
mocracy" similar to the Soviet type.1"2 After attempts to rebuild an
economy ravaged by the Second World War, anger at a collapsing eco-
nomic system overwhelmed with debt and an artificial and incompetent
political system, reached a breaking point in August of 1980. A strike
began in the shipyards of Gdansk and then spread to other industries,
forcing the government to accept the right of workers to organize in
independent unions, a first for any Marxist state.103 Solidarity, the free
union founded by Lech Walesa, motivated workers to launch a drive
for social and economic liberty and improved working conditions.'0° A
national strike for five days in 1981 led to anti-strike legislation and
ultimately, to martial law, which did not end formally until mid-
1984.105 In response to dissent, the Polish government embarked on a
102. See POLAND: A HANDBOOK 167-68 (Wydawnictwo Interpress pub. 1974)
(describing the adoption of the constitution for the Polish People's Republic).
103. See Seligman, Poland Might Be Only the Beginning, TIME. Dec. 1, 1980, at
103 (speculating on the effects of the successful Polish workers revolt in other Central
and Eastern European nations).
104. See Polish Unions, Party, Church Join Unity Call, Wash. Post, Dec. 17,
1980, at Al (describing the unrest during the 1980 Polish workcr strikes).
105. See Fascell, Helsinki, Gdansk, Madrid, 7 WASHINGTON Q. 170, 170 (1984)
(describing the effect of martial law on Poland).
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
series of partial reforms of the economy that proved insufficient to over-
come the mismanagement of the economy through central planning. 10
Despite Prime Minister Rakowski's attempts to decentralize the pri-
vate sector, the statistics for 1989 showed little improvement, and the
Prime Minister's well-intentioned efforts failed to arrest the economic
decline.0 7 There was no real growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
for 1989.118 Investment spending declined two percent, and personal
consumption decreased one percent. 09 The current account deficit for
1989 tripled to two billion dollars (three percent of GDP) from $580
million in 1988.110 Poland's hard currency debt totaled approximately
forty billion dollars at the end of the year."' The soft currency debt,
most of which Poland owes to the Soviet Union, was 5.8 billion trans-
ferable rubles at the end of 1989 ($1.4 billion at early 1990 exchange
rates)." 2 Recently, though, Western industrialized nations agreed to
erase fifty percent of Poland's debt, forgiving thirty percent of their
loans immediately, and another twenty percent in three years if Poland
sticks to its reform plans."'
The failing economy led to increased resistance to the government
and, thus, to another wave of strikes in 1988." Consequently, the gov-
ernment re-legalized Solidarity and allowed its members to compete in
elections because the government could not quell the dissent."" Soli-
darity achieved a stunning victory, acquiring almost all of the Senate
seats and all 169 seats they were allowed to contest in the Sejm."'
106. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IM-
PLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, POLAND 1-12 (1990) (describing the economic
situation in Poland in 1990).
107. See id. at 4 (explaining Prime Minister Rakowski's efforts to decentralize the
state-run economy after taking office in September 1988). "A 'second stage' of eco-
nomic reform launched in October 1987, following the unsuccessful 1981-1986 "first
stage," yielded little improvement in the [Polish] economy." Id.




112. Id. In addition to Poland's total hard and soft currency debts, Poland owes the
Soviet Union approximately one billion dollars in hard currency. Id.
113. Polish Debt Cut in Half, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 1991, at Al.
114. See Echikson, Poland's 'Economic' Decision to Close Shipyard is Laced with
Politics, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 2, 1988, at 13 (reviewing the demands of the
Polish workers during the 1988 strike); Poland; No Way Out, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27,
1988, at 41 (considering the effect of the 1988 Polish worker's strike on Poland's
economy).
115. See Singer, Solidarity-The Road to Power, NATION, Oct. 1989, at I
(describing how Solidarity achieved political power through strikes).
116. See id. (citing Solidarity's sweeping victory in the 1989 legislative elections);
see also The Curtain Rises, L.A. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, at Q6 (considering Poland's
move into "unchartered territory" and the emerging political position of Solidarity).
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At the beginning of 1990, the Polish government introduced an un-
precedented economic reform program seeking to abolish the Soviet-
style central planning system and to institute a market economy based
on free prices, private property, and unrestrained competition." 7 In this
"leap to the market,"' 8 the new Polish government slashed the budget,
cut subsidies, tightened the money supply, and radically devalued the
zloty.119 Further, by decontrolling prices, the government sought to en-
courage foreign competition even at the risk of bankrupting state enter-
prises.120 Poland's "leap to the market," however, resulted in swift and
traumatic economic effects.12' By late January 1990, inflation had
soared to eighty percent and then subsided to an approximately five
percent rise each month.'22 Wages dropped sharply in real terms. In
September 1990, four percent of the work force, 700,000 workers, were
unemployed. Analysts then expected this to nearly double by the end of
1991. As of April 1991, unemployment had already risen to over seven
percent of the workforce. 2 ' Additional joblessness will likely grow from
mass bankruptcies as the economy forces old and/or obsolete enter-
prises to close. 2 4 Furthermore, the Polish standard of living has
dropped as much as thirty percent in the last year alone.12
Throughout 1990, the Polish zloty has been internally convertible so
that any Pole can exchange zlotys for Western currency. 20 As a result,
the once familiar black market money traders have virtually disap-
peared. 27 Although, Polish companies, both private and public, have
117. Singer, supra note 115, at 7.
118. House, supra note 8.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Within a few weeks the costs of some basic necessities such as electricity
increased more than 300%, and the price of vodka doubled. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Horne, Currency Devalued by Poland, Wash. Post, May 18, 1991. at C2.
(describing Poland's deepening economic troubles in achieving a market economy).
124. See Knight, Poland's Feud in the Family, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Sept. 10, 1990, at 52, 56.
125. Id. at 56. "[A] year ago today [in Poland], 30% of an average family's in-
come was spent on food; today, the toll is 60% because wages are not keeping pace
with rising prices as government subsidies are lifted. Using a car has become a luxury;
gasoline prices are up 500 percent." Id.
126. See Engelberg, Czech Conversion to a Free Market Brings the Expected
Pain, and More, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1991, at A3 (describing Czech and Polish efforts
toward a free market economy); see also House, supra note 8 (explaining why Poles no
longer demand payment in dollars).
127. See Engelberg, supra note 126 (contrasting the free exchange of zloty for
Western currency in Poland to the limited exchange of S200 a year in Czechoslovakia
and the effect on each country's black market).
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shown surprising strength in the international market, the country had
a trade deficit of $225 million in April 1991.128
The Polish Antimonopoly Office (PAO) began operation in April
1990, following passage of The Monopolistic Practices Act on February
24, 1990.129 The prime minister appointed the president, Anna
Fornalczyk (an academic economist from the University of Lodz), a
vice president, and a director general. The PAO is a central state ad-
ministrative institution subordinate to the Council of Ministers. It con-
sists of seventy lawyers and economists and should expand to 120 law-
yers in the near future."' 0 The PAO coordinates all matters within
antimonopoly jurisdiction as well as any organizational changes in the
Polish economy, superseding the Department of Counteracting the Mo-
nopolization of the Economy in the Ministry of Finance. 131 The De-
partment of Counteracting the Monopolization of the Economy in-
cludes two units-the Jurisdiction Section and the Antimonopolistic
Policy Section.
13 2
The Jurisdiction Section has concluded 220 cases against monopolis-
tic practices 13 3 in its first two years. 34 The Antimonopoly Office began
nineteen cases as of May 1990. During the entire existence of the An-
timonopoly Office and its predecessor agency, 200 decisions resulted in
the imposition of sanctions.3 5 Moreover, the Jurisdiction Section car-
ried out emergency interventions along with legal interpretation of eco-
nomic policy. 13 PAO had initiated nineteen cases through September
1990.137
The agency is divided into two groups. One group, managed by law-
yers, focuses on monopolistic practices and has spearheaded a number
of cases brought under the price gouging statute. The other group,
managed by economists, is in the process of studying the structure of
Polish industry to develop a plan for structurally demonopolizing Polish
128. Powers, In Poland's Economic Path-Potholes, L.A. Times, May 17, 1991, at
A5.
129. Polish Monopolistic Practices Act (Feb. 24, 1990), supra note 63.
130. Supplemental Letter provided by the Polish Anti-Monopoly Office [hereinaf-
ter Supplemental Letter]; see also Polish Monopolistic Practices Act, supra note 63,
ch. 5, art. 17 (describing the hierarchy of the PAO).
131. Supplemental Letter, supra note 130; see also Polish Monopolistic Practices
Act, supra note 63, ch. 5, art. 19 (stating that the duties of the PAO include monitor-
ing observance of the act, monitoring the formation of prices, issuing decisions and
researching the state of the economy).








industries. The agency will use this group's findings to determine which
industries trigger a presumption of market dominance. In identifying
priorities for demonopolization, the PAO plans to determine which en-
terprises to break up by (1) identifying industries with high market
shares and significant barriers to entry; (2) determining if the enter-
prise is engaged in monopolistic practices; and (3) identifying sub-ele-
ments, such as factories, that have expressed interest in being separated
from the state monopoly.
The Antimonopolistic Policy Section (Policy Section) dealt with
cases concerning structural changes in the Polish economy.138 Such
changes included the division and combination of firms as well as the
formation of new enterprises.1 39 In 1988 and 1989, the Policy Section
turned down nine of the forty-eight applications received and did not
introduce their changes.140
The Ministry of Finance chose five companies to spearhead the tran-
sition from "socialist property"'' 4 1 to joint-stock companies. All five are
labor intensive, use regional raw materials, and are not high technology
industries. The first, Exbud, sends Poles abroad to construct roads and
factories. The second, Prochnik, exports trenchcoats. The third, Sile-
sian Cable, spins high quality copper wire. The fourth, Krosno Glass-
works, creates fine, hand blown crystal. The last, Tonsil, assembles
sound systems for sale under Japanese and German labels." 2 More-
over, the antimonopoly body, at the impetus of the registration courts,
143commented on the question of eighty-four commercial companies.
There were no objections in fifty-one cases, eighteen of them were
turned down and there were certain reservations in fifteen cases.14
Many of the basic provisions in the Polish antimonopoly law are con-
sistent with antitrust principles that have developed in market econo-
mies. As noted above, the Polish law is primarily modelled after Ger-
many's legislation. For example, firms with relatively low levels of
concentration (thirty percent) can be classified as dominant, subjecting
them to statutes that significantly restrict the types of agreements that
can occur between buyers and sellers. There also appears to be a will-
ingness to use the law to enable the Antimonopoly Office to roll back




141. Newman, supra note 8.
142. Id.; Engelberg, supra note 8.
143. Supplemental Letter, supra note 130.
144. Id.
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"price gouging" statute, similar to those seldom used statutes in the
German and EC laws,'14 5 has presented problems for the PAO and cre-
ated concern in the business community.
Both the group in charge of policing monopolistic practices and the
group designed to spearhead structural monopolization had found sig-
nificant problems obtaining the information necessary to conduct their
mandate. Accordingly, Polish government officials asked the FTC/DOJ
working team' 6 extensive questions about how United States antitrust
agencies gather information on basic subjects such as sales and market
shares. 4 The PAO is developing alternative data sources, utilizing re-
search institutes and universities to assist with the data collection.
In addition, the PAO experienced administrative and organizational
problems in its first few months. The administrator in the FTC/DOJ
working team explained how the FTC organized its regional offices so
that the PAO could learn from the FTC. In addition, Polish officials
wanted to discuss methods to ensure such basic concerns as workers
putting in a full eight hour day and other similar concerns.
PAO officials also discussed several alleged violations of the Polish
Antimonopoly law with members of the working team. Some of the
most visible allegations involved prosecution of "price gouging." One of
the first of these involved an automobile manufacturer called FSO. The
PAO alleged that the automobile manufacturer had raised the price of
medium sized automobiles to monopoly levels. There are only two auto-
mobile manufacturers in Poland, FSO and FSM, and few imported
cars that sell at prices Polish citizens can afford. Accordingly, there
may be valid reasons to believe that FSO would be able to keep prices
above cost at least in the short run. It was, however, extremely difficult
for the PAO to demonstrate that the prices were not just adjusting to
reflect the true cost, and the Antimonopoly court overturned the deci-
sion to force FSO to roll back prices. This case is now on appeal to the
Polish Supreme Court.
Another case that focuses on potential price gouging targeted the
Ursus Tractor Company. The Ursus Tractor Company is the only man-
ufacturer of one type of particularly popular farming tractor, although
there is competition in other types of tractor manufacturing. In March
1990, the company raised prices 100%, followed by a fifty percent in-
crease later in that month. In June 1990, it increased prices ten percent
145. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 31, 38; Treaty of Rome, supra note 21,
art. 86.
146. The FTC/DOJ mission to Poland took place from September 16-30, 1990.
147. The Polish government has essentially collected such information in the past,
but that data were frequently unreliable and now many are no longer even collected.
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more. As with the FSO case, demonstrating that these price increases
are not cost based is difficult. Such calculations might be material to
some types of antitrust in the United States where there are good cost
data and a relatively stable market that has based prices on cost for a
number of years. In Poland, however, many prices have been sup-
pressed below the actual cost of production. Further, accounting and
other data are extremely poor and do not reflect the market value of
imports or assets. Accordingly, the PAO is seeking alternative methods
to determine what are "extremely high prices." Its inquiry examined
tractor prices in other countries, but international comparability issues
are difficult to resolve, especially during Poland's transitional period.
The PAO also investigated monopolistic practices and collusion
among competitors that would lead to investigations under United
States antitrust law. For example, the PAO is investigating the actions
of forty-five local grain processing and milling enterprises. Defining the
geographic market was problematic, however, because each of the
processing and milling enterprises had limited local storage that pre-
vented enterprises from different regions from actively competing for
the grain production by farmers in more distant localities. Whether the
local monopsonies (monopoly buyers) were due to technological con-
straints or to the grain processors' efforts to suppress the price of grain
sold by the farmers, however, was unclear at the time of our discus-
sions. Upon further analysis, the PAO determined that there were in-
deed competitive, not technological problems. Accordingly, it has is-
sued seventeen decisions to break these processors up, two of which
have already been implemented. " 8
Similar questions arose regarding dairy cooperatives after they were
allowed to act as independent enterprises, while they were still state-
owned. Evidence indicated that after dairy production and pricing deci-
sions were decentralized, the dairies decided that they would divide the
market so that they could charge monopoly prices for processed milk
while paying below competitive level prices for the raw milk. In the
context of United States antitrust enforcement, such agreements would
be found per se unlawful, and those involved in the conspiracy could be
subject to criminal penalties.
Another horizontal price fixing case involved Pozndn, a city of about
500,000 inhabitants.14 9 Hotel prices rose two hundred to three hundred
percent during the week of an annual international fair in 1990. The
148. Letter to Dr. Langenfeld from Anna Fornalczyk, Director General of the Po-
lish Antimonopoly Office, April 15, 1991.
149. Id.
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state-run tourist agency, Orbis, published the tariffs that all hotels in
the city followed, although Orbis only owned three of the five city ho-
tels. Such price increases, however, could reflect "peak load" pricing,
for example, entailing increased prices of hotels during the high season
in a resort area. Because all rooms appeared to be full in the city dur-
ing this peak period, that is, there was no reduction in output to raise
prices, United States law most likely would actively pursue this pricing
as anticompetitive only if there were some evidence of an agreement on
prices between Orbis and the other hotels in the city.
Some of the most problematic questions placed before the PAO in-
volved Hortex. Hortex owns between eight and ten food processing
plants. A French investor expressed interest in buying the entire com-
pany but refused to purchase any parts of the company if it were bro-
ken into two or more competitors.
Under these circumstances, antimonopoly and other policies create
tension. Hortex badly needed new capital to improve its production
processes and modernize equipment. Such improvements would lower
costs, improve distribution, lower prices, and increase quality of
processed food in Poland. If there is not adequate competition from
imports, however, the French investor could solidify the monopoly posi-
tion of Hortex, delaying competition in the food processing industry.
Solutions considered included reducing the tariffs on imported
processed foods from twenty percent to a nominal figure in order to
provide a check on any attempt to raise prices to a monopolistic level.
In other areas, the beginnings of demonopolization are taking place.
Although the Polish privatization has not yet affected many firms,
there has been at least one case in which the PAO directly addressed
competition concerns in the privatization process. This case involved a
large grain milling firm with three plants northwest of Warsaw that
was split into three separate firms in the course of the privatization
process. The PAO has considered other candidates for break-ups in the
privatization process, including a national network of twelve gas pro-
ducers and a vertically integrated tobacco monopoly.
In sum, the PAO is extremely active in grappling with many difficult
questions and trade-offs. Only the Polish people, however, can make the
multidimensional trade-offs facing them in their transition period.
B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Czechoslovakia is not as far along in its implementation of a compe-
tition policy as Poland. This is consistent with the Czechoslovak gov-
ernment's slower implementation of market reforms. Czechoslovakia
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has not experienced a long period of failed reforms as Poland has, and
the economy is not in as critical condition. Accordingly, Czechoslovakia
has adopted a more cautious approach to market reforms. Like Poland,
Czechoslovakia is working to restructure its economy from a state-con-
trolled to a free-market system.150 To this end, the Czechoslovak gov-
ernment passed legislation in 1989 regarding state-owned enterprises,
joint ventures, tax reform, banking and currency, and a realignment of
the wholesale pricing structure.1 51 The banking reform would, in the-
ory, give the central bank the authority to set monetary and credit pol-
icy without government control, a major step if this works in
practice. 52
Nevertheless, Czechoslovak GDP growth was under two percent in
1989.153 Czechoslovakia's hard currency borrowing grew slowly and
still remains low and largely connected with trade financing.'" In
1989, the Czechoslovak government reported foreign debt at $6.7 bil-
lion,1 55 and asserted that developing countries' debts to Czechoslovakia
offset this debt.156 The relatively low level of debt and its modest hard
currency surpluses have made the country appealing to Western bank-
ers, though there is concern over the country's ability to service the
debt in the long run.' 5 As a result of this uncertainty, Czechoslovakia
allows only businesses planning investments for overseas trade to ex-
change large quantities of crowns for Western currencies. 68
The Czechoslovak government began its privatization initiative in
1991 by compensating or returning assets to owners of the assets prior
150. See White, Trading Stalinism for Capitalism, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1991. at
DI (describing Czechoslovakia's plans of privatization).
151. See INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN EcoNoMlc
TRENDS (FET) AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
8 (1990) [hereinafter FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA] (describing the
1990 economic situation in Czechoslovakia).
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 7.
155. Id. at 8.
156. Id. This claim, though, remains moot due to the problems arising from collec-
tion of this debt. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Engelberg, supra note 126 (comparing the internal convertibility of na-
tional currencies in Poland and Czechoslovakia for Western currencies). Czechoslovak
economic reforms have resulted in hardships on the nation's path to capitalism. Id. The
government has slightly increased coal prices, in contrast to the 600% increase in the
cost of coal in Poland. The government has postponed adjusting other energy costs,
however, until it can fit apartments with thermostats. Costs of staples such as meat,
bread, and sugar increased sharply but the effects of these increases have been delayed
due to hoarding. Id. In Western terms, these increases do not sound severe, but the
average Czechoslovak wage is estimated at only S130 a month. Id.
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to their takeover by the Communist regime.' Perhaps most important,
it has begun a process of "small privatization" where retail establish-
ments, such as restaurants, have been auctioned to private citizens' 00
and the "Large Privatization Law" was passed February 26, 1991,101
which includes antitrust review of privatization of companies with
thirty percent or more of a market.' 62
A major concern in Czechoslovakia has been maintaining the rights
of the two separate republics that comprise the Federation: the Czech
and the Slovak Republics. This concern touches all aspects of reform,
including the creation and implementation of competition policy. The
Slovak Republic has had a functioning Antimonopoly Office since mid-
1990. The Czech Republic named someone to head its office in June.
The Federal Office for Economic Competition began formal operation
in May 1991. Minister Imrich Flassik, a Slovak, heads the federal of-
fice, which is located in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. All three
agencies will enforce the antimonopoly law passed in February 1991 .13
An FTC/DOJ working team visited Prague and Bratislava in Octo-
ber 1990. They explained United States antitrust laws and provided
159. Czechs to Return Seized Property, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1991, at AI0;
Czechoslovakia's Parliament Approves Privatization Law, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1991,
at A16.
160. White, supra note 150.
161. Arbess, supra note 66.
162. White, supra note 150.
163. Competition Protection Act of January 30, 1991, Pt. III, Offices for Economic
Competition, art. 10. The act distributes authority between the three agencies as
follows:
(1) The authority of the office for economic competition is vested with
(a) the Federal Office for Economic Competition, in cases concerning
1. protection against limiting or eliminating competition in cases when supplies
by an entrepreneur or joint supplies based on contracts in accordance with Arti-
cles 3, 4, and 8, take or may take a share of the relevant market of the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic each, in excess of 40 per cent,
2. representation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in international ne-
gotiations and agreements with authorities for economic competition in other
countries,
b) the Office of the Czech Republic for Economic Competition, in cases concern-
ing protection against limiting or eliminating competition which may have effects
in the territory of the Czech Republic, apart from execution of authority in ac-
cordance with Section a/l.,
c) the Slovak Antimonopoly Office, in cases concerning protection against limit-
ing or eliminating competition which may have effects in the territory of the
Slovak Republic, apart from execution of authority in accordance with Section
a/I.
(2) The offices, on mutual agreement, may submit to one another individual
cases concerning protection of economic competition to be dealt with and de-
cided, if this is advantageous for a better and faster investigation into the case,
and if the entrepreneurs concerned agree.
[VOL. 6:347
COMPETITION POLICY
comments on a small number of investigations taking place at the
Slovak Antimonopoly Office. At the end of the mission, Finance Minis-
ter Vaclav Klaus asked for informal technical comments on draft an-
timonopoly and price control laws. Subsequently, the Federal Legisla-
ture passed the Competition Protection Act of January 30, 1991.11,
The competition law addresses how to maintain and create competi-
tion and is also largely based on German cartel laws. To create compe-
tition, the law includes a section on temporary measures granting the
agencies additional powers during the transition period. These addi-
tional powers give the competition agencies power to ensure that during
privatization no local monopolies will be created by state and local
officials.
The law does not differentiate between agreements among competi-
tors and agreements between buyers and sellers. Yet, the most signifi-
cant danger to competition occurs when entrepreneurs competing with
each other agree not to compete. Accordingly, the close policing of
agreements between entrepreneurs selling the same or similar products
could be an important part of preventing supracompetitive pricing,
while most agreements between buyers and sellers will be
procompetitive.
The law envisions limiting the ability of firms to contract, whether a
contract is between competing firms or between a buyer and seller. A
general limitation of such agreements could greatly undermine any de-
centralized market economy. One of the keys to a successful market
economy is that independent firms must live up to their commitments.
Otherwise, a succession of breached commitments would create busi-
ness uncertainty, discouraging investment and entrepreneurial activity.
Competition might be encouraged more if the competition agency had
the power, subject to the appropriate court review, to negate only those
contracts found in clear violation of the competition law.
The law also envisions that the agency will approve of many sales
contracts in advance. Complete review of sales agreements between
buyers and sellers, however, could overload the staff of a competition
agency. If so, automatic approval of agreements if no challenge took
place within two months would speed the reform process, but could also
miss important antitrust cases. An antimonopoly agency might want to
reserve the right to challenge such agreements if their effect proves an-
ticompetitive. The competition agency, therefore, could overturn agree-
ments that proved anticompetitive. It might be desirable to condemn in
advance only agreements that can be shown to have anticompetitive
164. Competition Protection Act of January 30, 1991, No. 63/1991.
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consequences, such as price fixing and market division among competi-
tors. Although this approach in itself would create some business un-
certainty, to use this rule of reason style of analysis rather than one
that discourages entire classes of agreements that are likely to be effi-
cient might be better.
The law also lists exceptions to agreements that would otherwise be
illegal. In particular, the law exempts agreements that include less than
thirty percent of the market. There are good economic reasons to be-
lieve that agreements among competitors without market power would
have no anticompetitive effects, and the thirty percent cut-off is pre-
sumably a proxy for that. United States law, however, completely bans
some agreements that have been found to have significant anticompeti-
tive potential and few redeeming virtues. The law also allow firms to
negate contracts unilaterally if one of the parties decides that the
agreement disadvantages them. Under certain circumstances, such as
where there is an inability to deliver goods due to natural disasters,
contracts should be breached. The competition laws, however may not
be the place to define such breaches. Instead, they should be defined in,
for example, the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead of giving parties
the right to breach contracts, it may be better to give the competition
agencies the power to invalidate contracts when they are anticompeti-
tive. Parties to such contracts could be able to petition the competition
agency, but they should not necessarily be given the right to withdraw.
The draft law also created a presumption of illegality of a merger if
one of the merging parties had twenty percent or more of the market.
The United States also pursues a vigorous enforcement policy against
potentially anticompetitive mergers, but the level of sales triggering
concern in many instances in the United States is higher than twenty
percent. 16 5 Considering the relative size of the United States and
Czechoslovak economies, it is surprising that Czechoslovakia would
consider such a low standard even though barriers to entry are unques-
tionably higher in Czechoslovakia. In the final version of the law, this
threshold was raised to thirty percent. Such a change is a clear im-
provement, but the threshold may still be too low. Specific mention of
the importance of barriers to entry in the analysis of mergers would
also have improved the Czechoslovak approach.
Similar to other Eastern and Central European laws, this law could
be used to protect competitors rather than competition. Vigorous com-
petition will always work to the detriment of some entrepreneurs, par,




ticularly those that are inefficient and unresponsive to consumer de-
mand. Although a firm with market power or a large share of a market
may be able to damage a competitor unfairly by, for example, raising
the costs of a new entrant, this will take place only under certain cir-
cumstances. The guide of thirty percent for market dominance and the
attendant presumption against certain agreements between buyers and
sellers, although consistent with EC law, would be considered too low
in the United States, and may be too low in an economy the size of
Czechoslovakia's. Hence, if Czechoslovakia should seek a competition
law similar to that in the United States, then that law would not be
used to protect firms that would be driven out of business because they
cannot compete.
Moreover, the law envisions government-approved cartels similar to
those the German Cartel Office approves. Given the difficulty in trans-
forming enterprises into competitive entities, such condoning of cartels
could hinder the transition without necessarily providing benefits to the
competitiveness of Czechoslovak enterprises. Although there are good
reasons for harmonizing Czechoslovakia's competition laws with those
of its Western European trading partners, condoning cartels may not
be the best way to transform its economy into a competitive one.
Czechoslovakia has established a system of state and national anti-
trust enforcement similar to that of the United States. Although the
system has worked in the United States, the system may have draw-
backs for a country the size of Czechoslovakia. Permitting each repub-
lic to decide independently whether to challenge a potentially anticom-
petitive act could lead to overly aggressive enforcement of a
competition law and could result in unnecessary business uncertainty
and impediments to competition. 16
The Czechoslovak law gives the federal antitrust agency primary ju-
risdiction over agreements and mergers for firms that comprise (or
166. For example, consider a merger of two firms that have plants in the Czech
and Slovak republics. Assume that the acquiring firm plans to shut down a plant in
Slovakia and expand production facilities in Bohemia, resulting in an increase in em-
ployment for both the republics. In addition, assume the cost reductions associated with
the merger reduces prices throughout Czechoslovakia. United States antitrust laws
would usually permit such a merger. Unless a "public interest" standard is clearly
defined in the Czechoslovak antimonopoly law, an individual republic could stop such a
merger, which would not improve competition and would likely harm consumers.
As a second example, assume that there is an inefficient firm in Bohemia that has
lost market share to a more efficient competing firm offering lower prices. The more
efficient firm is primarily located in Slovakia. It might be possible for the firm in Bohe-
mia to petition the Czech Republic to prevent what the Bohemian firm claims are
"monopolistic practices," but which simply reflect socially desirable competition from
the Slovak firm.
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could comprise) more than forty percent of a relevant market in both
the Czech and Slovak republics. The offices can, on mutual agreement,
submit individual cases to one another. However, the potential
problems of enforcement efforts that will harm the country overall
while benefitting one republic still exist, particularly in the area of mo-
nopolistic practices where the federal government will apparently play
no role.
Similar to the Polish Antimonopoly Office, there appears to be a ten-
dency to regulate price rather than industry structure. For example, in
Slovakia, the Antimonopoly Office was investigating recent price in-
creases in refrigerators by Celex. Rather than relying on cost data, the
Antimonopoly Office concentrated on the fact that the manufacturer
alleged stockpiling of refrigerators by Celex, creating an artificial
shortage to force prices up. As discussed above, such "price gouging"
statutes can be counter-productive because they can discourage new en-
trants and foreign investment.
On balance, Czechoslovakia appears to be taking a slower, and per-
haps more methodical, approach to competition policy. Problems may
arise in its enforcement, however, if the three agencies cannot effec-
tively coordinate their activities.
C. BULGARIA
Despite the severe economic crisis facing it, Bulgaria has decided
that competition policy is an important part of its reforms. The country
just recently passed legislation.
Like Poland, Bulgaria's economic performance gradually has deterio-
rated since the early 1980's and is currently in a state of deep crisis. 1 '
At the end of 1989, total external debt was $10.2 billion.'0 8 Between
1986 and 1989, the budget deficit ranged from four percent to seven
percent of G.D.P. 1 9 Inflation rose in the first quarter of 1990 to
9.4%,171 and the average rate of inflation in 1989 was 6.2%."" In
1990, the trade deficit widened, exports to convertible currency markets
were low,"' and foreign direct investment was limited. 73 Industrial
167. BULGARIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH & TRANSITION, supra note 6, ch. 3, at 4.
168. I. Angelov, Background and Current Situation of the Bulgarian Economy, in
BULGARIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH & TRANSITION PROJECT, supra note 6, ch. 2, at 4
(1990).
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 12.
173. Id. at 13.
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output fell 8.5% in the first quarter of 1990.174 According to Prime
Minister Dimiter Popov, leader of the current de facto coalition gov-
ernment, 175 this reduction in output was due to a shortage of raw and
prime materials, "the upset production and technology relations,"' 7
and the restriction of markets for certain kinds of products.
Bulgaria recently has taken a number of significant steps towards
creating a market economy. These steps include devaluing the ex-
change rate and creating a floating exchange rate,17 7 lifting restrictions
on the establishment and staffing of private enterprises,' 78 significant
liberalizing of prices,'179 and re-establishment of private ownership
rights. '8 Although no actual privatizations have yet taken place, the
Bulgarian government implemented a decree in January 1989 that has
set the stage for privatization.' 8' The government circulated draft legis-
lation for comments in February 1991 that would establish an Eco-
nomic Coordination and Development Agency and a Privatization
Agency, along with draft laws on foreign investment,' 82 and ex-
changes.8 3 It has adopted a law establishing the ownership and use of
agricultural lands. 84 The coalition government freed most prices on
February 1, 1991.185
In the fall of 1990, a group of Bulgarians representing various politi-
cal factions visited the FTC to discuss competition policy and a draft
competition law with FTC Commissioners Azcuenaga, Strenio, and
Owen. In late November, the FTC and DOJ made informal comments
on a draft Bulgarian competition law. The Agreement between the Po-
litical Forces Represented in Parliament on Guaranteeing a Peaceful
Transition to Democratic Society, signed in Sofia on January 3, 1991,
174. Bulgarian Output Drops 8.5%, Wall St. J., May 14, 1990, at AI0.
175. Bulgaria Says It Plans Economic Shake-Up, N.Y. Times. Jan. 24. 1991, at
A8.
176. Declaration by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Bulgaria Dimiter Popov on Behalf of the Government, Sofia (Jan. 23, 1991).




181. Id. ch. 4, at 4. The decrees that enacted the reform package approved by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) were independent of this document, but they re-
flected many of the basic principles of transition to a market economy discussed in this
document.
182. Id. ch. 1, at 15-22.
183. Id. ch. 3, at 6.
184. Id. ch. 3, at 4.
185. Crawshaw, Call for Urgent Action to Avert "Catastrophe" in Bulgaria, Inde-
pendent, Feb. 16, 1991, at 12.
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ordered the transition toward a market oriented economy. 86 Finishing
the drafting of a bill on the protection of competition and demono-
polization was a high priority under this agreement."' At the request
of the Bulgarian government and the United States Department of
State, a total of four economists and lawyers (two from the FTC and
two from the DOJ) visited Sofia and Plovdiv, Bulgaria's two largest
cities, to consult with government officials on demonopolization and
competition policy. These talks, taking place between March 18 and
March 27, 1991, involved meetings with Deputy Prime Minister
Ludjev. The DOJ and FTC subsequently submitted additional informal
comments to the Bulgarian government on issues arising out of these
talks. Similar to many Central and Eastern European countries, calcu-
lating market shares and the potential for market power can be diffi-
cult. The comments focused on the method of determining "market
definition" provided by section two of the United States Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines, as well as the application of broad indus-
trial codes as a precursor for determining market share and market
power. A market share based definition could provide enterprises with
more certainty about whether they are in monopoly positions because it
is easy to ascertain one's market share. At the same time, however, a
market share based definition could prohibit practices that would have
no anticompetitive effects. For example, if entry by new competitors is
not difficult, then market share alone will not indicate market power.
Also, enterprises whose temporary monopoly position results from en-
trepreneurship do not pose a threat to the competitive process, but may
simply be the result of competition.
It was unclear whether the draft law contemplated the commission
and specialized court system or an agency acting as a prosecutor in the
context of a general court system. The decision makers in the commis-
sion system are trained in applying a decidedly complex law and are
better equipped to use sophisticated economic reasoning. The United
States, however, uses its strong court system to provide a check on both
the FTC and the DOJ, and this appears to function well.
The draft law did not provide criminal penalties. It may be desirable
to deter some illegal behavior with the prospect of criminal punishment
as well as with large monetary penalties. Such penalties should only be
appropriate for well-defined and well known anticompetitive acts, such
186. Agreement between the Political Forces Represented in Parliament on Guar-
anteeing a Peaceful Transition to Democratic Society, Jan. 10, 1991, Bulgaria, FBIS-
EEU-91-007.
187. Id. at 13.
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as price-fixing. There are also reasons to have the penalty be a multiple
of the illegal gain or at least large enough to deter illegal behavior. It
was not certain that the fines envisioned would be large enough to deter
illegal behavior.
Under the draft law, the Commission, along with the Ministry of
Trade and Services, may establish conditions for contracts and prices
compulsory for persons in monopoly positions. As discussed above,
competition better ensures reasonable prices and choice of products
than does price regulation. In the United States, industry-specific legis-
lation determines whether to regulate and how to get a regulated price
only in the rare cases where natural monopolies are found to exist.
Most economists would agree that the burden should be on those who
wish to regulate prices to prove that such regulation is necessary. This
should subject fewer industries and more of the economy to market
forces. Price regulation is most effective in situations where consumers
have essentially one supplier, imports cannot compete, and new sources
of supply cannot enter.
It also may be important to give the competition agency authority
over other parts of the government for the purpose of encouraging com-
petition. Similar to the Czechoslovak law, the Bulgarian Commission
may have the power to sue other governmental agencies to compel the
division of companies established by them. However, the Council of
Ministers, Bulgaria's equivalent of the executive branch of the United
States government, apparently has taken the position that the minis-
tries controlling state enterprises can and will rapidly move to demono-
polize the Bulgarian economy.188
There are advantages to having one government agency perform both
functions of enforcing antimonopoly and consumer protection laws.
Briefly stated, buyers can make correct purchasing decisions only on
the basis of truthful information. Advertising, however, is generally
procompetitive, so too vigorous a consumer protection policy may limit
some truthful information and thus damage competition. Accordingly,
where deceptive advertising practices are found, it is desirable to con-
sider the effect on competition. This may best be done by having one
agency enforce both competition and consumer protection laws.
188. Discussions with the staff of the Council of Ministers, Sofia, Bulgaria, March
18-27, 1991.
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D. HUNGARY
Of all of the Central and Eastern European countries, Hungary ap-
pears to have the most experience with market economies and is closely
tied historically to Germany. It is not surprising, then, that its competi-
tion policy appears to be most closely tied to Germany's. Despite these
ties, the Hungarian economy is in need of economic reform.
In 1990, the GDP per capita in Hungary was $2,206, lower than in
both 1988 and 1989.189 Production and profitability have declined. 9 0
Inflation was more than twenty percent during the first half of 1990.191
Hungary's gross hard currency debt is approximately $21.7 billion." 2
Its 1989 trade surplus was $540 million."'
According to Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, privatization in Hungary
will occur over a period of three to five years during which the govern-
ment will liberalize ninety percent of prices and abolish most subsi-
dies."' Currently, competition is very weak in Hungary. Large corpo-
rations having 10,000 or more employees hold monopoly positions.', 0
The government, an enterprise, or an external party may initiate priva-
tization. One hundred thirty enterprises were privatized in 1990, and
400 firms are to be privatized in 1991.191 The State Property Agency
has instituted new rules that could affect the speed at which privatiza-
tions are accomplished.' 7 Hungary is unique because many firms are
self-owned and controlled by councils generally composed of manage-
ment. 9 8 "Sweetheart deals," known as "spontaneous privatizations,"
between managers and buyers occur frequently. 9
Hungary has announced a battery of initiatives to reduce the state
control. It aims to reduce state control from eighty-five to fifty percent
189. U.S. DEP'T. COM., FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES: HUNGARY, FET 90-74 (1990).
190. Id. at 3.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 5.
193. Id. at 6.
194. National Bank of Hungary Executive Challenges Atlantic Council Position,
MTI ECONEWS, Feb. 22, 1991.
195. Voros, Collusion between Market Operators and Abuse of Dominant Posi-
tion: The Hungarian View, 7 OECD (1990).
196. Hungary Revises Privatization Program to Allow Hostile Takeover Proceed-
ings, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 93 (Jan. 16, 1991).
197. See id. (quoting Property Agency Director Lajos Csepi: "Under the change,
investors can ask the agency to privatize a business, bypassing the sometimes uncooper-
ative management committees of the state-owned concerns themselves.").
198. D. ELLERMAN, MODELS AND METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION FOR HUNGARY,
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP SERVICES INC. AND INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION,
SOMMERVILLE, MA, at 2.
199. Id. at 2-3.
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of the competitive sector of the economy within three years.2 0 The
country has taken the major step of permitting investors to stage
"raids" on state owned companies, unless they are clear monopolies,
utilities, or financial institutions.01
On May 11, 1990, a delegation from the FTC and the DOJ, includ-
ing FTC Chairman Janet Steiger and Assistant Attorney General
James Rill, met with Ferenc Vissi, President of the Hungary National
Price Office, and other government authorities on competition policy.
Dr. Vissi informed the delegation that their draft competition law and
draft price regulation law reflected three years of study by thirty to
forty specialists reviewing competition laws throughout the world. The
Hungarian government enacted a competition law in late 1990.
To the extent that the draft legislation did not change substantially,
the final competition legislation suffers from several weaknesses. First,
similar to the law in Czechoslovakia, the proviso of a dominant firm at
thirty percent appears too small. In most American industries, which
are larger and less concentrated than industries in the smaller Hun-
garian economy, antitrust officials believe that seventy percent market
share would be necessary for a firm to truly dominate a market.
20
Second, the law appears to focus too much on protecting competitors
and not enough on protecting competition. This confusion existed at
times during the antitrust enforcement history of the United States.
This country's antitrust agencies, however, now are committed to com-
petition and consumer welfare rather than to protecting competitors.
Third, the cartel office offers advance advisory opinions to firms at-
tempting to organize or increase competition. Rendering such advisory
opinions would require a very large staff and could delay many pro-
competitive activities.
Finally, the law prohibits exclusive franchises without any market
power test. Such a prohibition could eliminate what has been found to
be a very efficient form of organization in the American economy. Sim-
ilarly, another section of the law made dealer termination per se illegal.
Antitrust law in the United States generally classifies price fixing,
bid rigging, and group boycotts, and all other horizontal restraints as
per se illegal, while vertical restraints, with the exception of resale
price maintenance, are governed by a rule of reason analysis.20 3 The
200. Sara Lee Buys into Hungarian Food Company, Financial Times (London).
Feb. 22, 1991, at 5.
201. Id.
202. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 79, at 118.
203. See R. BORK, supra note 14, at 260-98 (discussing the treatment of horizontal
and vertical restraints under per se and rule of reason analyses).
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Hungarian law apparently reverses this approach by making vertical
restraints per se illegal and horizontal restraints subject to rule of rea-
son analysis. As already discussed, currently prevalent antitrust and ec-
onomic theory do not support this.
Some sections of the draft law's description of the Antimonopoly Of-
fice's powers were noteworthy. One section of the draft law provided
that the parties could seek an advisory opinion from the competition
supervising authority as to whether the department will prohibit the
proposed merger. This would be useful, particularly at the beginning of
implementation. This section, however, might also pose difficulties by
diverting staff and resources away from general enforcement activities
to relatively few individual matters.
Finally, the investigatory powers of the Hungarian competition su-
pervising authority seem overly broad in comparison with the powers of
the United States antitrust authorities. For instance, the person carry-
ing out the investigation can enter any room or part of the premises of
the entrepreneur and can ask for any information verbally or in writing
from any employee of the entrepreneur concerned. Further review of
the Hungarian competition situation is clearly warranted, since the
competition authority appears to be well on its way to being a fully
functioning agency in an economy that has the longest exposure to the
market systems of the West. Furthermore, the draft price regulation
legislation we viewed would involve the cartel office in actively setting
prices, rather than allowing the market to do so. That legislation at-
tempted to make "price gouging" and "unfair prices" illegal. There
could be shortages due to unanticipated demand, and the price system,
which allows prices to rise and induce more production, is the best way
to eliminate such shortages. These price changes are natural and not
anticompetitive but are difficult to distinguish from conduct that may
be characterized as "gouging."
E. SOVIET UNION
The Soviet Union has not yet passed an antimonopoly law, although
a draft law has been introduced at the legislature. The Russian Repub-
lic enacted a competition law in March 1991. How these laws will fit
into the current economic reforms is unclear.
In October 1990, President Gorbachev unveiled his plan for the So-
viet Union's transition to a market economy.2"4 The plan required dis-
204. Brady & Boyle, The Economy Will Turn into a Wild Beast, Bus. WK., Nov.
5, 1990, at 71.
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mantling of the economic monopoly of the state government. 20 1 Beyond
this broad policy objective, the plan had no further details. 200 Indeed, a
recent study of the economy of the Soviet Union concluded that the
plan did not provide for the elimination of restrictions on the products
which individual enterprises are permitted to produce and did not even
mention how import liberalization can promote competition.207 The
Gorbachev plan also postponed the liberalization of the pricing system
and the abolition of subsidies to unprofitable firms.208 A committee
composed of republic representatives would oversee economic policies
under the plan.
On November 23, 1990, President Gorbachev presented a Union
Treaty to the Supreme Soviet. 209 At that time, what the relative roles
of the union and republic governments would be in promulgating and
enforcing competition policy were unclear.210
As of February 1991, the Soviet Union's economic reform was in
disarray.21I The Soviet Union's economic situation contributed to the
difficulty in implementing reforms. For example, at the end of 1989,
the gross hard currency debt of the Soviet Union was approximately
$48 billion.212 Its gross debt was approximately $33 billion,21 3 and out-
put of key industries declined in 1989.2" Gross National Product Per
Capita was $9,236 and fell two percent in 1990.215 National income fell
by four percent in 1990, and labor productivity by three percent. 216
It is widely believed that Moscow is shying away from a market-
oriented economy.217 New relationships continued to develop between
the various republics and the all-union government, and events in the
Baltic republics put Soviet membership in various international organi-
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zations on hold.21 a On February 13, 1991, the Kremlin announced a
plan to raise retail prices two to three times, but the legislature of the
Russian Republic rejected this the very next day.21 9 Subsidies on most
consumer goods also would be lifted according to this plan. 22 0
In November 1990 and February 1991, staff of the FTC and the
DOJ participated in OECD consultations with the Soviet Union and
the Russian Republic concerning their draft antimonopoly laws. At the
invitation of the OECD Center for Cooperation with European Econo-
mies in Transition, Soviet and Russian officials consulted with officials
from six OECD countries and with the OECD Secretariat. The draft
laws appeared similar to those of the Central European countries, con-
taining many of the same strengths and weaknesses. The draft legisla-
tion of the Russian Republic was subsequently enacted. The FTC and
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ are planning to hold a seminar on
competition policy and law enforcement for both union and republic
officials in Washington, D.C. in the near future.
CONCLUSION
If the old production, distribution, and governmental structures are
swept away, and strong financial institutions are developed, and new
institutions create the proper incentives, then a competitive market sys-
tem similar to that in the United States and other market economies is
likely to grow in Eastern and Central Europe. An effective competition
policy is an integral part of these changes. Although it is unlikely that
competition policy in these countries will mirror that of the United
States, the American system has a great deal to offer in terms of ana-
lytic approach and institutions. Thus countries such as Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and Bulgaria have been motivated to seek technical assistance
from the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ in developing and
applying competition policy.221 While competition policy may not be
the first thing needed in these countries, it is a key part of the reform
process.
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